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Resum
L'  objectiu  d’aquest  treball  és  l’estudi,  implementació  i  prova  d'un  sistema  de 
autentificació compartida per  a  múltiples servidors.  Encara que des d'un principi  es 
sabia que es treballaria amb Shibboleth també s’han tingut en compte altres possibles 
solucions. Shibboleth és un projecte desenvolupat per els membres de les universitats 
que formen el consorci Internet2 amb l’ objectiu de desenvolupar un nou middleware 
per a realitzar les funcions d’autentificació compartida en múltiples servidors i pensat 
específicament  per  facilitar  la  col·laboració  entre  institucions  i  l’accés  a  continguts 
digitals.
Shibboleth  és  una  solució  complerta  ja  que  contempla  des  de  l’autentificació , 
autorització i accounting, fins al sistema de login i els atributs a emprar. La qual cosa fa 
que es converteixi en un entorn de treball molt segur però amb l’avantatge d’aportar 
privacitat als usuaris.
 
El primer objectiu ha estat identificar les peculiaritats i requeriments dels entorns de e-
learning distribuïts, per això s’ha estudiat conceptes específics de seguretat així com la 
manera d’adaptar-los  a  l’entorn  requerit.  Desprès s’ha fet  una  comparativa  de  les 
solucions existents  al  mercat  amb una funcionalitat  similar  a  Shibboleth,  per  tal  de 
presentar els avantatges i desavantatges  de Shibboleth vers aquests.
 
Posteriorment,  el  treball  ha  consistit  en  entendre  la  estructura  i  els  principis  de 
funcionament  de  Shibboleth,  quin  tipus  de  requeriments  tenia,  el  funcionament  i 
objectius de cada part, estudiar els requeriments de l’entorn específic per al qual ha 
estat  dissenyat  (e-learning)  i  donar  una  idea  general  de  com  s’ hauria  de  fer  la 
implementació. També s’han estudiat totes les tecnologies i requeriments necessaris 
per desenvolupar Shibboleth.
 
Una vegada estudiat Shibboleth i l'entorn específic en el que s’hauria d’integrar, s’ha 
muntat un escenari per a la posada en marxa i proves d’aquest, provant específicament 
cada  part  i  entenent  amb  les  proves  reals  el  funcionament.  Amb  l’escenari  en 
funcionament, la idea era integrar Shibboleth amb Sakai i Blackboard, els CMS (Course 
Management System) utilitzats a on-campus, el campus virtual de la Fachhochschule 
Lübeck.
 
Per a finalitzar i  a mode de conclusions s'ha fet  una petita explicació dels resultats 
obtinguts,  una  valoració  de  com  Shibboleth  resoldria  les  necessitats  plantejades  i 
algunes propostes de millora. 
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Overview
The subject of this work is a study, implementation and test of a shared authentication 
in multiple servers system. Although it was thought that Shibboleth would be the final 
studied and deployed system, other solutions were considered too at the beginning.
Shibboleth is a project developed by members of universities participating in Internet2 
partnership  with  the  objective  to  develop  and  to  deploy  new  middleware.  This 
middleware  facilitates  the  authentication  functions  of  shared  resources  in  multiple 
servers and makes easier the collaboration between institutions and access to digital 
contents  and  e-learning  environments  in  university  surroundings.  Shibboleth  is  a 
complete  solution  because  it  enables  the  authentication,  authorization,  accounting, 
system login  and  the  attributes  to  use.  It  makes  the  scenario  very  secure  without 
compromising the privacy of the users.
The  first  part  of  the  work  explores  the  peculiarities  of  distributed  requirements 
surroundings of e-learning environment, so specific concepts of security as well as the 
way to apply them were studied.
The next part of the work was a comparison among Shibboleth and other solutions 
available in the market and in this way the advantages of Shibboleth are described. 
After  that,  the work shows the structure and the main issues of  Shibboleth and its 
operation and objectives. The surrounding requirements were also studied, specifically 
those used in e-learning, and a general concept of the work and of the basis of the 
technologies implied in Shibboleth were also considered. 
Once the technical part was studied and documented, an scenario to test the system 
was constructed. Each part was proved, and when the basic example proves finished 
some CMS existing in the market were integrated to the project too. Basically Sakai and 
BlackBoard,  the  ones  used  in  on  on-campus  (the  e-learning  environment  at  the 
Fachhochschule Lübeck) and Moodle as new proposal of use.
The last part is a conclusion and evaluation of how to deal with Shibboleth needs and 
some improvement suggestions.

Dedico aquest treball a tota la gent que ha estat al  
meu  costat  durant  aquests  anys  de  estudi,  als 
pares, als amics, als companys i al grup de rdv. 
També a tothom que m'ha ajudat en la elaboració 
de aquest treball tant a Lübeck com a Barcelona.
Per finalitzar, no em voldria oblidar de la gent que 
d'una  manera  o  un  altre  col·labora  en  la  
elaboració i difusió del programari lliure.
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die  Zielsetzung  dieser  Arbeit,  ist  die  Studie,  die  Implementierung und  der  Test  einer 
geteilten Authentisierung im mehrfachen Bedienersystem. Obgleich vom Anfang ich weiß, 
dass die Zielsetzung Shibboleth sind, auch andere mögliche Lösungen haben betrachtet.
Shibboleth  ist  ein  Projekt,  das  von  den  Mitgliedern  der  Universitäten  von  der 
Teilhaberschaft  Internet2  mit  der  Zielsetzung,  um  neues  middleware  zu  entwickeln 
entwickelt  wird  und  zu  entfalten,  um  Funktionen  von  Authentisierung  geteilten 
Betriebsmitteln  in  den  mehrfachen  Bedienern  und  hauptsächlich  für 
Universitätsumlagerungen und vom e-Lernen mit der Zielsetzung zu bilden, eine einfache 
Weise zu verbessern,  die  Zusammenarbeit  zwischen Anstalten  und dem Zugang zum 
digitalen Inhalt zu handhaben gedacht ist. Shibboleth, ist eine komplette Lösung, da es 
von der Authentisierung erwägt, Ermächtigung und Acounting zum System LOGON und 
zu  den  Attributen,  um  zu  verwenden  also  bildet  das  Drehbuch,  das  sehr  ohne  das 
Privatleben der Benutzer sich zu vergleichen gesichert wird.
Der Erste Schritt der Arbeiten, die, die Eigenheiten und die Anforderungen der verteilten 
Umlagerungen  des  e-Lernens,  für  dieses  zu  kennzeichnen  seiner  sind,  habe  ich 
spezifische  Konzepte  der  Sicherheit  sowie  die  Weise,  sie  an  den  erforderlichen 
Umlagerungen anzuwenden studiert. 
Der Folgende Schritt, obgleich ich freies dass die Software habe, die, alle Erwartungen zu 
erfüllen  Shibboleth,  da  ein  Vergleich  diese  Software/vorhandenen  Lösungen  im Markt 
studiert haben, haben eine Funktionalität waren, die Shibboleth und sich die diese Anzeige 
darzustellen/Vorteile  von  Shibboleth  ähnlich  ist.  Später  hat  die  Arbeit  bestanden,  die 
Struktur und die Grundregeln von Shibboleth zu verstehen, denen Art von Anforderungen 
a,  den  Betrieb  und  Zielsetzung  jedes  Teils  haben,  um  die  Anforderungen  der 
Umlagerungen zu studieren, die ich spezifiziere für, welches gewesen es entwerfen lässt 
(e-erlernend) und ein allgemeines Konzept sollte von, wie man zu bilden arbeiten ist. Auch 
ist im Detail allen Technologien studiert worden, auf denen Shibboleth basiert.
Einmal  studiertes  Shibboleth  und  die  Umlagerungen,  in  denen  sein  muss  integtated, 
entfalte ich ein scenerio für den Anfang und die Tests von Shibboleth und prüfe spezifisch 
jedes Teil und das Verstehen auf realen Tests des Betriebes, prüfen einmal in einer realen 
Szene, ist der Folgende Schritt gewesen, wie die Integrierung irgendeines CMS von das 
Bestehen im Markt zu studieren, damit es mit Shibboleth funktionierte, im Allgemeinen ich 
studieren Sakai und Tafel, welches sie die sind, das in on-campus des Fachhochschule 
Lübeck verwendet wird.
Das Letzte  ist  Zusammenfassungen ist  geworden  eine  Auswertung von,  wie  man die 
Shibboleth Notwendigkeiten und einige Anträge der Verbesserung löst.
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INTRODUCTION
The objective of  this work is  the study and implementation of  a  shared authentication 
system for Web servers. The aim is to fulfill the on-campus (e-learning environment of the 
Fachhochschule Lübeck) requirements, the objective is to design a system that avoids the 
multiple actions of login for the student when access to content distributed across different 
servers. 
With this objective,  a first study of the specific requirements of e-learning environments, 
and  also  of  some necessary  concepts  of  security,  needed  for  the  Shibboleth  correct 
operation, was made.
First of all, and although Shibboleth had already been chosen as the definitive solution, a 
comparative among different likely systems has to be made. After that, a study of  the 
individual components of Shibboleth, the ways to integrate them, and the software needed 
to make it work, has to begin. 
Once finished the Shibboleth theoretical  knowledge and before start  with  the practical 
work,  Is  also necessary to study the requirements that  Shibboleth needs to work,  the 
software under which works and some concepts and technologies in which is based.
The next step in the project is to implement, in a practical way, the knowledge acquired in 
the  early  stages,  materializing  it  all  in  a  physical  scenario  to  develop  each  part  of 
Shibboleth. When a simple example of authentication has been implemented, and works 
properly, the study of the CMS (Course Management System) would begun. With the idea 
to integrate Shibboleth with it. 
A study will become of some CMS in particular and the way of Shibbolize (integrate the 
authentication system so that it works with Shibboleth) Sakai and Blackboard, the CMS 
used in on-campus (The e-learning environment on the Fachhochschule Lübeck)
The next part of the introduction talks about how this paper is organized.
The first chapter is an introduction to the e-learning environments, to their peculiarities and 
requirements.  It  also  explains  basic  subject  security  concepts,  like  federation.  It  also 
shows the main concept to work at: the authentication based on attributes.
The second chapter is an overview of the existing solutions for the exposed requirements 
and a comparison of Shibboleth with other systems.
In the third chapter there is an explanation and a complete perspective of  Shibboleth: 
basic concepts, development facts and procedures to explain every part of the scenario in 
depth. And also some of the goals that Shibboleth has to fit in the proposed solution are 
explained.
The  fourth  chapter  presents  a  perspective  of  all  software  and  concepts  based  on 
Shibboleth. Mainly it is an introduction to the concept and later how Shibboleth is used .
An exhaustive explanation of the implementation in the chosen scenario can be found in 
the fifth chapter. 
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The sixth chapter explains how to use Shibboleth as a system of authentication in CMS 
(Course Management System) and a guide for the implementation.
The last chapter, the seventh, shows the general conclusions of the work as well as some 
improvement proposals for development.
In the appendixes, there is a glossary with some of the abbreviations used in this paper 
and  a  short  description  of  some  concepts  to  use  as  reference.  As  well  there  are  a 
explanation  about  an  example  of  Shibboleth  in  action  and concluding  the  appendixes 
there are some explanations about how to install the software.
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CHAPTER 1: THE FACT. SHARED AUTHENTICATION
1.1 Introduction
Shared authentication is  the fact  of  once the user  is  authenticated in  the system and 
verified the privileges, that although this user access to another resources and the new 
server not require again him to authenticate. The idea is the servers interchange some 
attributes and based on some polices grants the access to the resources.
Authorization mechanisms require an authorizing agent to query some type of database to 
check the privileges of the concerned user. Nevertheless, in a panorama of the cross-
domain, this requirement can be heavy. In the first place, given the number of users in the 
several domains, the great data bases would be unmanageably. Secondly, the users and 
the administrators of system would be equally reluctant to have sensible information of the 
user stored in so many diverse locations. This makes a new mechanism necessary to 
handle with effectiveness the authentication and the authorization of the cross-dominion.
Authorization  based  in  attributes,  whereas  not  a  new concept,  are  winning  quickly  in 
reputation.
Attribute based authorization essentially considers more granularity in the process of the 
authorization,  because  one  can  choose  what  information  to  assert,  and  considerably 
simplifies the tasks of the administrators of the network since they don't have to maintain 
accounts for foreign users. Basing decisions of the authorization on the qualities or the 
“papers” of the users, the lists of complex control of access are needed not more for each 
resource. Everything is required that it's a system of mappings simple that they contain the 
several  respective papers and their  privileges.  Thus, also primary targets are to avoid 
copies  of  the file  of  passwords between different  servants  and to  guarantee the  safe 
access to the resources without invading the privacy of the user.
1.2 The new scenarios (e-learning, course management systems, 
libraries, etc.)
Every time more the education, remote or face to face, it's nourished of contents on-line 
and these normally aren't centralized, the necessity arises to regulate the access to the 
information is of the own institution or as which they serve firstly like support to teaching 
because sometimes they are resources with copyright and in other occasions for audit 
questions. For this reason, one of the recent fields of investigation is like allowing the user 
to access to all the necessary resources in an easy way (for example with same login and 
password) without the disadvantages of having to distribute files of password between all 
the servers.
Scholarship and higher education students increasingly depend on digital information, and 
the on-line sources that provide them, for  research and teaching.  These sources vary 
greatly in size, focus, function, and scope. Valuable teaching and research materials might 
be found in a dataset collection on a departmental web site, in a repository of images run 
by a university library,  or  in a licensed commercial  database of  journal  articles.  Large 
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numbers  of  these data  sources,  often  known as  digital  repositories,  now exist,  and a 
scholar is likely to require materials drawn from multiple repositories to support research or 
teaching on a particular topic.
There are also, a growing interest among academic institutions in collecting, preserving, 
reusing  and  creating  value-added  services  from  digital  content  produced  in  and  for 
research, teaching and learning. 
The emphasis on research outputs and collaboration, and distance, flexible and on-line 
learning, together with developments in information technology, has led to an increased 
awareness that the digital content being created by members of the academic community 
is an institutional asset. At the same time many academic libraries are responding to the 
challenges of new technologies by taking the opportunity to redefine their fundamental role 
in the creation, distribution and provision of access to information. Over the past decade 
libraries have moved almost completely towards a digital platform for management of the 
information (both print and electronic) that they acquire or subscribe to. They have built 
significant  digital  collections of  material  published by others,  and they are increasingly 
producing new content themselves. Often this content originates from, or is the intellectual 
property of, their own institutions. 
Some  services  may  be  made  available  to  restricted  user  groups  only,  such  as  the 
database provided to medical students by the scientific library. On the other hand, the 
networking of institutions has lead to a situation where the service provider and the user 
are not from the same organization.
Teaching itself is increasingly supported by software applications, both to support distance 
education  and  to  supplement  traditional  face-to-face  instruction.  In  particular,  many 
colleges and universities have deployed or are developing learning management systems, 
also  known as  “courseware,”  to  support  instruction.  These systems are often  used to 
deliver information drawn from internal or external digital repositories. Smaller, specialized 
learning applications also take  advantage of  content  from digital  repositories,  such as 
electronic  course  reserve  systems,  personal  bibliographical  databases,  digital  portfolio 
managers, and presentation and analysis tools.
To make the most effective use of digital content in teaching, learning applications need to 
be able to easily interoperate with digital repositories so that teachers and students can 
discover, access, view, quote, adapt, and evaluate appropriate learning material. Because 
this, grows the necessity of improve distributed learning where the resources, the students 
and the teachers are located in different server/organizations.
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1.2 Security Concepts and the e-learning environments.
1.2.1 AAA. Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
Any discussion regarding access to and use of information resources must, at some point, 
consider the primary concepts of authentication, authorization and accounting. 
-Authentication: Authentication refers to the process by which a user’s claim to an 
identity is checked and verified.
In a e-learning environment, authentication is needed in order to guarantee that only 
registered students of the participating institutes can access the on-line courses.
-Authorization:  Authorization is  the process of  giving someone permission to  do 
something. 
In a e-learning environment, after a successful authentication phase the student is 
given access to some of the resources and based on an on-line timetable  the 
students can reserve timeslots for accessing certain parts of the application.
-Accounting: Accounting  is  the  process  which  measures  the  resources  a  user 
consumes  or  plans  to  consume  during  his  session.  Accounting  is  used  for 
authorization control, billing, trend analysis and capacity planning activities. Due to 
the limited resources, accounting has to be used for authorization control. 
In a e-learning environment,  this  means that  students cannot  access the whole 
application at once but are just given access to a certain module based on their on-
line reservations.
For the implementation of the AAA, in an e-learning environment is needed an application 
to  manage  this  action,  one  of  the  solutions  is  the  authentication  and  authorization 
infrastructures.  The  Authentication  and  Authorization  Infrastructures  are  middleware 
systems, consisting of a set of protocols that enable the delegation of authentication and 
authorization issues to different instances. The infrastructures provide all the necessary 
mechanisms that let users,  organizations,  and resources collaborate in the system. An 
authentication and authorization infrastructure requires three entities in order to provide its 
functionality; Home organization, resources and users. 
Home Organizations are universities or other entities, where the potential users (students 
or  staff  members)  are  registered.  The  home  organization  is  responsible  for  the 
authentication of their respective users. The users possess at least one account at a home 
organization.  Resources exist  in two forms:  either  they are web-based,  or  they act  as 
services for authentication and authorization infrastructure users. If a user wants to access 
a  resource,  the  authentication  and  authorization  component  of  the  resource  asks  the 
user’s home organization for the authentication. Upon successful authentication, the home 
organization sends back a set of  attributes containing the information about the user’s 
home organization role.
It is a precondition in authentication and authorization infrastructures that user information 
released by home organizations is reliable and accepted by the resource providers. Based 
on these attributes, the resource authorization system decides if  the access should be 
granted or denied.
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Authentication  and  authorization  infrastructures  bring  advantages  for  all  the  involved 
entities in  the process of  accessing protected resources.  The home organizations can 
increase the quantity of accessible resources by their members with a minimal overhead. 
The users take advantage of a simplified resource access procedure. The advantage for 
the resources consists in a decreased administration overhead (they do not need to create 
accounts for their users), and the reliable user information, since the attributes sent by the 
home organization are trustful.
An authorization process is based on the exchange of user authorization attributes in the 
form of name/value pairs. A policy which allows controlling this exchange of attributes is 
desirable.  Some  authentication  and  authorization  infrastructures  provide  such  a 
functionality which enables the users to make a trade-off between access and privacy. 
This mechanism is enforced by the Attribute Release Policy (ARP). In order to authorize 
users, resources need a policy which defines a minimal amount of attributes they must 
receive. This policy is called Attribute Acceptance Policy (AAP). Based on users attribute 
release  policy  and  resources’  attribute  acceptance  policy,  users  are  able  to  access 
resources. Only users providing the required attributes are granted access to the resource.
Privacy is conceptually feasible, though impractical, as it would require isolating one’s self 
from the world.  Beyond such simplistic definitions, it  seems prudent to shy away from 
making  definitive  statements,  in  that  privacy  has  a  very  subjective  nature.  Privacy 
advocates,  however,  often appear  to treat  the subject  in a similarly  simplistic manner. 
Statements are made claiming some action will result in a loss of privacy. Yet, defining that 
loss is often avoided or subjectively stated. 
Privacy  is  a  function  of  the  prevailing  culture,  social  context,  political  context  and the 
individual ideals. Concerns widen from purely physical equivalents (such as unauthorized 
distribution  of  personal  photos),  to  include  more  intimate  details  of  one’s  self.  These 
changes speak in a different way, for in an electronic world one’s identity is captured easily 
in reproducible bits of information.
Given the  above  discussion,  we  see difficulty  in  defining  privacy  without  tying  it  to  a 
specific attributes and individuals. In the anonymity discussion that follows, we describe a 
means of providing this connection.
1.2.3 Anonymity
Systems that allow users to control the amount of personal information (IP address, email 
address, physical address, real name, etc.) revealed to different entities on the Internet 
can be used to reclaim an individual’s on-line privacy. We consider two forms of on-line 
privacy, anonymity and “pseudonymity” (although in practice both are normally referred to 
as anonymity). A system that provides anonymity hides the user’s identity unless the user 
chooses to reveal  their  identity.  “Pseudonymity”  is  a type of  anonymity;  however,  with 
“pseudonymity” the user maintains one or more distinct identities (pseudonyms) that are 
not connected to the user’s physical identity. 
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Most systems use some secret that only the user who created the pseudonym knows to 
ensure that people with whom the user interacts using a given “nick” can be assured that, 
although they do not know the physical identity behind the “nick”,  it's in fact the same 
person each time. However, more than one person may “share” a single “nick” simply by 
sharing  the  secret.  In  contrast,  anonymous  systems  that  provide  strong  or  unlinkable 
anonymity do not leave any persistent information that lets someone link any transaction to 
another transaction preformed by the same user.
1.3 Federations
Federation means a group of  organizations or  service providers which have built  trust 
among each other and enable sharing of user identity information amongst them. One 
proposal is a flexible approach to establish a Single Sign-On (SSO) ID in the federation. 
Then show how a user can leverage this SSO ID to establish certified and un-certified user 
identity attributes without the dependence on PKI for user authentication. This makes the 
process more usable and privacy preserving. The figure (Fig. 1.1) presents and overview 
of  a  Federation  concept.  The basic  purpose is  the  access possibility  to  any resource 
(hosted in SP) inside the Federation using the authentication service (IdP) from any of the 
Institutions that belongs to the Federation.
Practical  applications  of  federated  identities  are  represented  by  large  multinational 
companies which have to manage several heterogeneous systems at the same time. An 
effort in this sense is represented by the notion of SSO, which enables a user to login to 
Fig. 1.1: Overview of the Federation Concept
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multiple  organizations  or  Service  Providers  (SP's)  by  using  the  same  Username  and 
password. This approach increases usability and adds security by reducing the number of 
passwords that  need to  be managed.  Emerging standards are currently  extending the 
notion of federated identity to other user information referred to as identity attributes. The 
main goal of such extensions is to enable interoperability and link together redundant user 
identities maintained by different SP’s. An important requirement in this context is that the 
federation  environment  should  enable  SP’s  to  exchange  user  data  in  a  secure  and 
trustworthy manner while also enforcing the original privacy preferences of the user. 
Current federation solutions are built on top of Secure Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
specification  which  depends  on  Public  Key  Infrastructure  (PKI)  with  additional  trust 
relationships for it's security. As such, federations have to rely on PKI for exchanging data 
among SP’s, and between users and SP’s authentication. However, PKI has experienced 
numerous  implementation  problems  because  of  it's  technical  complexities.  It  is  also 
oriented towards strong identity granted through Registration and Certification Authorities, 
which is not always suitable for user privacy. Hence, the assumption of relying on PKI for 
all  types of  interaction  in  the federation is  not  realistic.  It's  needed articulated  identity 
solutions supporting multiple complementary options for digital identity.
A serious concern related with identity management, whatever solution is chosen, is the 
risk of  identity theft.  Despite guidelines have been provided on how to protect against 
identity  theft,  not  many  identity  theft  protection  solutions  have  been  proposed  so  far. 
Sensitive information in the Internet is currently hard to track and also consistent usage of 
the  proposed  solutions  is  extremely  hard  to  achieve.  In  a  federation  environment  it's 
possible to develop protocols able to achieve identity theft protection. As noted above, the 
security and privacy of the user identity information, both certified and uncertified, are of 
utmost  importance  today.  Security  prevents  theft  and  impersonation  when the  identity 
attributes are used and privacy protects against the disclosure of identity when the user 
has the right or expectation of anonymity.
If are expected to work with federations, two criteria for trustworthy attribute assertions by 
Credential Providers are: that the identity management system fall under the purview of 
the organization’s executive or business management, and the system for issuing end-
user  credentials  (ex.  PKI  certificates,  user-id's/passwords,  Kerberos  principals,  etc.) 
specifically  have  in  place  appropriate  risk  management  measures  (for  example 
authentication and authorization standards, security practices, risk assessment, change 
management controls, audit trails, etc.).  
At last but not at least, it's important to remark that one institution or institutions can be 
member of more than one Federation.
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1.4 Why shared/attribute based authentication.
One way of forming a federation is to assert an attribute and have this attribute examined 
by the authority of the remote resource. Attribute based authorization entails just such an 
assertion  by  an  authorization  service  of  attributes  associated  with  an  identity.  These 
attributes describe the 'role' or 'roles' of the identity of member at a university. An assertion 
for that principal identity might state that they have the ‘role’ of a faculty member. This 
allows role-based authorization to offer a very compelling privacy and anonymity solution. 
Identity becomes one more attribute of an assertion that may or may not be shared with 
various destinations.
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CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF SOLUTIONS
2.1 Introduction
Although from the beginning already was determined that Shibboleth is the technology to 
use, I want to compare Shibboleth with other existing solutions in the market. Thus for 
example Kerberos and the Single Sign-On (SSO) solutions. Kerberos is a solution based 
on tickets; the main idea is that when the user tries to accede to a resource, this it's turned 
aside to a server in whom after login and password provides ticket to him valued to accede 
to the resource during an assigned period. Kerberos is a solution very used and that has 
demonstrated it's functionality during long time. The other possibility is the Single Sign-On 
systems,  (Shibboleth  incorporates  an  SSO),  The  operation  principle  is  easy:  the 
authentication systems interchange information among them of a safe way so that it's not 
necessary that they are sent literally the login and the password.
2.2 Kerberos
Kerberos is a system for authentication in distributed computer systems. It provides strong 
authentication of clients and server using conventional cryptography. It also protects the 
confidentiality  and  integrity  of  communications  over  an  insecure  network.  Kerberos 
operates on the application layer, providing end-to-end security.
The Kerberos system was developed at Massachusetts Institute of Technology as a part of 
project  Athena.  One  implementation  of  Kerberos  is  freely  available  from  MIT,  and 
Kerberos  has also  been integrated  into  commercial  products  such as  Windows 2000. 
Kerberos is actively developed; the current version is version 5.
Kerberos  is  designed  to  operate  in  an  environment  where  the  network  itself  and  the 
workstations are not trustworthy. An adversary is assumed to be able to read, insert and 
modify  packets on the network.  The Kerberos  architecture is  designed around a  data 
element called a ticket.
The ticket  is  a set  of  cryptographically  sealed data that  lets a client  authenticate to  a 
server. The Kerberos system uses two trusted on line services. These services are the 
authentication service and the ticket-granting service.
The Authentication Server (AS) implements the authentication service, and is responsible 
for authenticating users and giving them tickets usable for contacting the Ticket-Granting 
Server (TGS). The ticket-granting server implements the ticket-granting service, and is 
responsible  for  issuing tickets  usable with  servers implementing other  services on the 
network.  The combination of  the AS and the TGS is called the key distribution center 
(KDC). This figure (Fig. 2.2) shows the different stages of the authentication process.
12                                                                                                              Shibboleth   and the challenge of authentication in multiple servers  
Both the TGS and the AS are trusted services, and are assumed to be physically secure. 
Each organizational unit has one TGS and one AS. Each such unit is called a realm or 
domain. Kerberos supports authentication of users across realm boundaries. The realm of 
a user belongs to is a part of the user’s name. Trust between realms can be established 
through inter-realm keys.
One  of  the  disadvantages  of  Kerberos  and  the  main  disadvantages  compared  to 
Shibboleth is that Kerberos needs a centralized organization that manages the tickets and 
because this, it does not fulfill the requirements.
2.3 Single Sign On Solutions
Another solution is a Single Sign-On System, this minds that the user only are asked for a 
login the first time that they enters in the system. Actually, most of the times when the user 
enter in the system are required to authenticate them, which is usually done by giving the 
user an account with an associated user name and password. The website could be an 
on-line shop where users need to  be authenticated to see their  current  orders.  Other 
examples of websites could be: news sites, game sites or libraries. This means a user 
could, potentially, have lots of accounts, each on different websites. It is tedious for a user 
to remember many user names and passwords, and often a user will resort to using only a 
single user name and password for every website. 
The basic  idea is the connection of the authentication mechanism of all the servers, this 
minds  they  are  allowed  to  interchange  some  attributes  and  allow  the  access  to  the 
resources.
From a security point of view, this is not a wise strategy. If a single login is in some way 
cracked and thereby compromised, all logins are compromised. Furthermore, it has a cost 
to the websites to manage the many accounts for their users. Each website needs their 
own system to issue new accounts, remove unused accounts, handle lost passwords and 
Fig. 2.2: Kerberos authentication process
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other  administrative  tasks  associated  with  the  accounts.  Also  the  accounts  are  often 
created ad-hoc,  websites cannot  truly  rely  on the identity  information stated,  when an 
account is created. Websites could be stricter and require valid identity information, but as 
it could exclude or scare some of their users this is often not an option.
These problems have motivated the development of new ways to authenticate users, of 
which Single Sign-On protocols are one. The purposes of these protocols  are to allow 
users to authenticate themselves to several websites using one account (Fig. 2.3), and if 
visiting more websites simultaneously or in quick succession, a single log on information is 
passed thought the servers. At the same time, when using a Single Sign-On protocol, each 
website  does  not  have  to  manage  accounts  for  users.  Account  management  can  be 
carried out at a central authentication site. As the users only have to use one account it 
should be easier to use and remember the associated password. Using a Single Sign-On 
protocol  the  user  only  should  create  one  account,  to  authenticate  themselves  to  the 
authentication site used by the websites providing the services.
The Internet2 consortium, have a group to develop SSO solutions called WebISO. The 
WebISO  Working  Group  is  investigating  the  realm  of  "web  initial  sign-on"  (WebISO) 
packages: systems designed to allow users, with standard web browsers, to authenticate 
to  web-based  services  across  many  web  servers,  using  a  standard,  typically 
username/password-based  central  authentication  service.  The  objective  is  to  share 
experience in this field and work towards in common solutions. The group output may take 
the form of:  recommendations for  best  practice and architecture; recommendations for 
interfaces  between  services  and  WebISO  infrastructure;  common  WebISO  protocols 
and/or common implementations. Web ISO is not software, are only recommendations and 
drafts  to developers like the Pubcookie project.  One of  these recommendations is  the 
Shibboleth projects that include a SSO and some other features.
Fig. 2.3: SSO Overview
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2.3.1 Shibboleth
Shibboleth is a project of Internet2/MACE with the aim of develops architectures, policy 
structures, practical  technologies, and an open source implementation to support inter-
institutional sharing of web resources subject to access controls. In addition, Shibboleth 
will develop a policy framework that will allow inter-operation within the higher education 
community. Key concepts within Shibboleth include: 
-Federated  Administration:  The  Identity  Provider  (origin)  campus  (home  to  the 
browser user) provides attribute assertions about that user to the Service Provider 
(target) site. A trust fabric exists between campus, allowing each site to identify the 
other speaker, and assign a trust level. Identity Provider sites are responsible for 
authenticating their users, but can use any reliable means to do this. 
-Access  Control  Based on  Attributes:  Access control  decisions  are  made  using 
those assertions. The collection of assertions might include the identity, but many 
situations will  not  require this  (ex.  accessing a resource licensed for  use by all 
active  members  of  the  campus  community,  accessing  a  resource  available  to 
students in a particular course). 
-Active Management of Privacy: The Identity Provider (origin) site, and the browser 
user, control which kind of information is released to the Service Provider (target). A 
typical default is merely "member of community". Individuals can manage attribute 
release via a web-based user interface. Users are no longer at the mercy of the 
target's privacy policy. 
-Standards Based:  Shibboleth will use OpenSAML for the message and assertion 
formats,  and  protocol  bindings  which  is  based  on  Security  Assertion  Markup 
Language .
-A Framework for Multiple, Scalable Trust and Policy Sets (Federations): Shibboleth 
uses Federations to specify a set of parties who have agreed to a common set of 
policies. (A site can be in multiple Federations.) This moves the trust framework 
beyond  bi-lateral  agreements,  while  providing  flexibility  when different  situations 
require different policy sets. 
-A  Standard  Attribute  Value  Vocabulary: Shibboleth  has  defined  a  standard  set  of 
attributes; the first set is based on the eduPerson object class that includes widely-used 
person attributes  in  higher  education.  It's  not  a  closed list,  can  be  possible  add new 
attributes.
When a user from one institution tries to use a resource of another, Shibboleth sends 
attributes about the user to the remote destination before login the user. The destination 
can use the attributes to decide whether or not grants the user access. Shibboleth lets 
each  user  choose  which  kind  of  information  about  them  can  be  released  to  every 
destination. In particular, a user may choose whether or not their name is sent to the 
remote site as an attribute, protecting privacy in scenarios where a users name is not 
necessary and with some other attribute, such as being affiliated with an institution, can be 
enough.
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A simplified view of the Shibboleth authentication is shown in the figure  (Fig. 2.4). On 
receiving  a  request,  the  target  site  establishes  a  handle  for  the  user,  then  requests 
attributes for that handle, and makes an authorization decision based on the attributes 
passed to the Attribute Authority (AA) so it can decide which attributes to release, based 
on Attribute Release Policies. The attributes will likely be non-identifying, like confirmation 
of institution membership, or age, so the sites do not receive any personal information 
about the user. The  AA at the SP however does see which sites (including URLs) are 
asking for attributes for the user, and if server at the AA  wished to do so, they could log 
this information.
Fig. 2.4: Shibboleth procedure
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CHAPTER 3: SHIBBOLETH IN DEPTH
3.1 Introduction
Shibboleth is a system designed to exchange attributes across realms with the primary 
purpose  of  authorization.  It  provides  a  secure  framework  for  an  organization  to  send 
attributes using the web-browser across security domains to another institution. The first 
time,  when  the  user  attempts  to  access  a  resource  in  a  domain  outside  the  home 
institution, the user own home security domain sends certain information about that user to 
the service provider site in a trusted exchange. These attributes are used by the resource 
server to help determine if grants the user access. The user have the possibility to decide 
release specific attributes to certain sites by specifying personal Attribute Release Policies 
(ARP's),  preserving  the  own  privacy  while  still  granting  access  based  on  trusted 
information.  This  drawing  (Fig.  3.5) shows  an  overview  of  the  Shibboleth  working 
procedure. The Appendix C explains step by step working procedure with a real scenario.
There are several controls on privacy in Shibboleth, and mechanisms are provided to allow 
users  to  determine exactly  which  information  about  them is  released.  A  user's  actual 
identity isn't necessary for many access control decisions, so privacy often is needlessly 
compromised. Instead, the resource often utilizes other attributes such as faculty member 
or member of a certain class. While these are commonly determined using the identity of 
the  user,  Shibboleth  provides  a  way  to  mutually  refer  to  the  same  principal  without 
revealing that principal identity. Because the user is initially known to the service provider 
site only by a randomly generated temporary handle, if sufficient, the service provider site 
might know no more about the user than that the user is a member of the identity provider 
organization. This handle should never be used to decide whether or not to grant access, 
and is intended only as a temporary reference for requesting attributes. 
Fig. 3.5: Shibboleth working procedure
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3.2 History and development facts
Shibboleth  is  being  developed  by  members  of  Internet2  with  guidance  from  the 
Middleware  Architecture  Committee  for  Education  (MACE)  group  of  higher  education 
architects and a major contribution of work from IBM.  Alpha and beta development were 
spearheaded by Carnegie Mellon University, Ohio State University, and IBM.
The version 1.0 of the Shibboleth System was released in June 2003. As of this writing the 
current  version,  1.3  (released  in  July,  2005)  is  in  use  or  in  test  by  more  than  150 
organizations,  including  universities,  research  labs,  commercial  service  providers,  and 
software  vendors.  Internationally,  Shibboleth  is  deployed  throughout  Switzerland  by 
SWITCH (the Swiss Education and Research network, EDINA in the UK, HAKA in Finland 
and many other university and research networks.
During the next year is expected to release the 2.0 version, the new version would be 
SAML 2.0-compliant and Single Sign-On logout support.
Several  non  Web-based  projects  such  as  instant  messaging,  peer-to-peer  resource 
sharing, and grid systems are actively exploring Shibboleth integration. A joint effort with 
Microsoft  is  under way to provide interoperability with the IBM-Microsoft Web Services 
Security Model. Finally, Shibboleth is in the process of being certified for use with the U.S. 
Federal E-Authentication Initiative.
3.3 The actors in Shibboleth
3.3.1 IdP (Origin)
There are four primary components to the identity provider side  (Fig. 3.6) in Shibboleth: 
the attribute query handler, the SSO handler, the directory service, and an authentication 
mechanism. The attribute query and SSO handlers are provided with Shibboleth, and an 
open-source WebISO solution, the directory is provided by the organization. Shibboleth is 
able  to  interface with  a  directory  exporting  a  JDBC or  JNDI  interface containing  user 
attributes,  and  is  designed  such  that  programming  interfaces  to  other  repositories  is 
straightforward.  Shibboleth relies  on standard web server  mechanisms to  trigger  local 
authentication. A <Location> block is used to trigger either an authentication mechanism 
such as local WebISO system, Kerberos, or the web server's own basic auth.
Fig. 3.6: Identity Provider block diagram
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-Authentication Authority: The authentication authority issues authentication 
statements to other components. The authentication authority is integrated with the 
IdP's authentication service.
-Single Sign-On Service: A single sign-on (SSO) service is the first point of contact 
at the IdP. The SSO service initiates the authentication process at the IdP and 
ultimately redirects the client to the inter site transfer service. The inter-site transfer 
service issues HTTP responses conforming to the Browser/POST and 
Browser/Artifact profiles. The inter-site transfer service interacts with the 
authentication  authority behind the scenes to produce the required authentication 
assertion. 
-Artifact Resolution Service: If the Browser/Artifact profile is used, the IdP sends an 
artifact to the SP instead of the actual assertion. (An artifact is a reference to an 
authentication assertion.) The SP then sends the artifact to the artifact resolution 
service at the IdP via a back-channel exchange. In return, the IdP sends the 
required authentication assertion to the SP.
-Attribute Authority: The attribute authority processes attribute requests; that is, it 
issues attribute assertions. The attribute authority authenticates and authorizes any 
requests it receives.
From the identity provider site's point of view, the first contact will be the redirection of a 
user to the handle service, which will then consult the SSO handler to determine whether 
the user has already been authenticated. If not, then the browser user will be asked to 
authenticate, and then sent back to the assertion consumer service URL with a handle 
bundled in an attribute assertion. Next, a request from the Shibboleth daemon, shibd, will 
arrive at the attribute query handler which will include the previously mentioned handle. 
The IdP then consults  the  ARP's  for  the  directory  entry  corresponding to  the  handle, 
queries the directory for these attributes, and releases to shibd all attributes the service 
provider is entitled to know about that user.
3.3.2 SP (Target)
A Service Provider (formerly a Shibboleth target) is a deployment of SAML software that 
validates  assertions  issued  by  Identity  Providers  and  uses  them to  create  a  security 
context and assists in the enforcement of access control based on the information. 
In Shibboleth, the Service Provider software is in C++ (and soon Java), and is provided as 
a  set  of  libraries,  services,  and  web  server  pluggins  that  implement  the  Shibboleth 
Specifications in  a flexible  way.  A  web  server  can  use  the  software  to  handle  user 
authentication and security session management for any web content and applications that 
it hosts. 
A service provider (formerly called a target) (Fig. 3.7) manages secured resources. User 
access to resources is based on assertions received by the service provider (SP) from an 
identity  provider. Note that the service provider has  access control in place that prevents 
access by clients without a security context.
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-Assertion Consumer Service:  The  assertion consumer service  (formerly called a  
SHIRE) is the service provider endpoint of the SSO exchange. It processes the  
authentication assertion returned by the SSO service (or  artifact resolution service, 
depending on the profile used), initiates an optional attribute request, establishes a 
security context at the SP, and redirects the client to the desired target resource.
-Attribute Requester: An attribute requester (formerly called a SHAR) at the SP and 
the attribute authority at the IdP may conduct a back-channel attribute exchange 
once a security context has been established at the SP. That is, the SP and IdP 
interact directly, bypassing the browser.
From  the  service  provider's  point  of  view,  a  browser  initially  makes  a  request  for  a 
Shibboleth-protected resource. The resource manager allows the service provider to step 
in, which will  use the Were Are You From (WAYF) to acquire the name of an identity 
provider  to  ask  about  the  user.  The  IdP  will  then  reply  with  a  SAML  authentication 
assertion containing a handle, which the assertion consumer service then hands off to 
shibd.  Shibd uses the handle and the supplied address of  the corresponding attribute 
query handler to request all attributes it's allowed to know about the handle. The resource 
manager  performs  some basic  validation  and  analysis  based  on  attribute  acceptance 
policies (AAP's). These attributes are then handed off to the application or used internally 
to decide whether to grant access.
3.3.3 WAYF and Federations
An optional WAYF service is operated independent of the SP and IdP. The WAYF can be 
used by the SP to determine the user's preferred IdP, with or without user interaction. The 
WAYF is essentially a proxy for the authentication request passed from the SP to the SSO 
service at the IdP.
The WAYF service can be either outsourced and operated by a federation or deployed as 
part of the service provider. It is responsible for allowing a user to associate themselves 
with an institution of their specification, then redirecting the user to the known address for 
the handle service of that institution.
A Shibboleth federation provides part of the underlying trust required for function of the 
Shibboleth architecture. A federation is a group of organizations(universities, corporations, 
content  providers,  etc.)  who  agree  to  exchange  attributes  using  the  SAML/Shibboleth 
Fig. 3.7: Service Provider  block diagram
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protocols and abide by a common set of policies and practices. In so doing, they must 
implicitly  or  explicitly  agree to a common set of  guidelines. Joining a federation is not 
explicitly necessary for operation of Shibboleth, but it dramatically expands the number of 
service  providers  and  identity  providers  that  can  interact  without  defining  bilateral 
agreements between all these parties.
A federation can be created in a variety of formats and trust models, but must provide a 
certain set of services to federation members. It needs to supply a registry to process 
applications  to  the  federation  and  distribute  membership  information  to  the  identity 
provider and service provider sites. This must include distribution of the PKI components 
necessary for trust between identity providers and service providers. There also needs to 
be  a  set  of  agreements  and  best  practices  defined  by  the  federation  governing  the 
exchange, use, and population of attributes before and after transit, and there should be a 
way to find information on local authentication and authorization practices for federation 
members.
3.4 Shibboleth goals
One of the goals of Shibboleth is protect user's privacy in a different ways. A user can 
choose which of their attributes can be released to any specific destination.  This means 
that a user may choose to send only that  they are a member of  a certain class to a 
collaborational project, may choose to send their name to the research group site they 
belong to, and may also choose to release that they are a student to a digital library. 
Frequently in current designs, identity is mapped backwards to determine attributes such 
as  member  of  a  particular  working  group,  which  is  then  used  to  govern  access  to 
resources.  Shibboleth reverses this process, allowing attributes to be sent with an identity 
optionally included only if it's necessary.  The target site will only know the attributes and 
information necessary to perform an access control decision, protecting users' anonymity 
in cases where their identity is not necessarily important.  This gives users a large amount 
of control and flexibility
about how their attributes are released and known.  Administration has the
capability to develop default guidelines for attribute release for users.
Another  goal  is  that  provide  a  way  to  exchange  attributes  in  a  secure  environment. 
Shibboleth has been extensively designed to protect attributes while in transit from many 
potential  attacks.   Hosts  in  all  communications  are  authenticated,  and  vulnerable 
transactions  are  protected  using  secure  channels.  Other  techniques  are  employed  to 
protect user privacy and defend against replay attacks.
It is important to note that Shibboleth does not provide any limitations on what the target 
can do with received attributes or what the origin can submit as a presumably accurate 
representation.  Trust agreements are necessary to define the population, retention, and 
use of attributes out of band.
Also  provide  a  useful  federated  administration.  Federated  administration  is  a  way  of 
making authentication, authorization, attributes, etc. useful to other domains . This allows 
for items of information that are established in one domain to be trusted in another domain 
based on the trust relationship between the two domains. 
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Doing so can reduce administrative burdens for all parties concerned without relying on a 
central authority or similar service to perform extensive operations.  A registry service is 
often still needed to host agreements reached by the federation, trusted information about 
which members are in the federation, or who is authoritative for which entity. 
And the last, Shibboleth emphasis on user privacy and control over information release. 
Shibboleth is a system for securely transferring attributes about a user from the user's 
origin site to a resource provider site. Again, Shibboleth allows users to determine what 
information is released about the user and to which site. Thus, the job of balancing access 
and  privacy  lies  ultimately  with  the  user,  where  it  belongs.  Shibboleth  also  keeps 
information local, meaning that a user does not have to worry (as much) about who has 
access to their user information and browsing behaviour.
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CHAPTER 4: SHIBBOLETH. BASED CONCEPTS AND 
REQUIREMENTS
4.1 Introduction
Because Shibboleth is a Middleware, it needs layers on which base the work and  facilitate 
that upper layers can work, it's why in this section are explained some basic concepts like 
HTTP, HTML Forms, SSL as well as applications on which work depend Shibboleth like 
SOAP, PKI, XML and SAML and finally some concepts of operation of  Shibboleth like 
Attribute-Based  Authentication  and  User  attributes  that  although  are  not  specific  of 
Shibboleth, it's needed to explain.
4.2 HTTP
Found everywhere on the Internet, HTTP (HyperText  Transfer  Protocol) is a ubiquitous 
protocol for data connections between Web browsers and servers.
This  protocol  is  the  current  standard  for  transferring  HTML  documents,  although  it's 
designed to be extensible to almost any document format like XML for example. HTTP 
Version 1.1 is documented in RFC 2068.
It operates over TCP connections, usually to port 80, though any other port can be used. 
After a successful connection, the client transmits a request message to the server, which 
sends a reply message back.
The simplest HTTP message is "GET url",  to which the server replies by sending the 
named document. If the document doesn't exist, the server may send an HTML-encoded 
message stating this. This form of communication represents a typical request/response 
mechanism. A client sends a request for a specific document to the server and waits for a 
response. If the server does not respond with the requested document it's up to the client 
to wait for the time-out and request the same document again. This loosely coupled type of 
communication is very common in client-server architectures.
In addition to GET requests, clients can also send HEAD and POST requests, of which 
POST's are the most important. POST's are used for HTML forms and other operations 
that require the client to transmit a block of data to the server. After sending the header 
and the blank line, the client transmits the data.
This way Web services utilize the HTTP protocol to transmit both data payload and service 
request to a Web service.
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4.3 HTML Forms
The main of the HTML Forms is submit a form to the destination specified by their action 
attribute. How the submission takes place is specified in the  method  and  encoding type 
attributes.  Most  HTML  forms  use  method="POST"  to  transmit  their  data,  because 
method="GET"  has a 255-byte restriction in the content size. Unfortunately most portal 
engines treat POST requests differently than GET requests.
GET requests are transmitted as name-value pairs encoded in URL parameters and can 
be extracted easily. These parameters can be forwarded to the remote site by constructing 
a new URL. Portals may use their own request parameters, like  portal-request-counter. 
These portal specific request parameters must be stripped from the request sent to the 
remote site, as they may result in unexpected results. 
POST requests  usually contain the form data in the request body not in the URL, but 
exceptions are the norm. There are three cases of form definitions which need different 
treatments:
-Forms with a definition like <form action="mailto:..."> are email forms. The action 
URLs  of  these  forms  must  not  be  encoded  by  the  portal,  because  it's  directly 
processed by the web browser which sends an email upon submission.
<form action="mailto:user@domain.com">
-Forms with a  definition like  <form method="POST"  enctype="application/x-www-
form-urlencoded">  must  be  treated  like  GET  requests,  because  the  browser 
encodes the form values into the request URL.
<form method="POST" enctype="application/x-www-form-urlencoded">
-Forms  with  an  attribute  method="POST"  and  without  attribute 
enctype="application/x-www-form-urlencoded"  are  "regular"  POST  requests  and 
require the request body to be forwarded to the remote resource by issuing a new 
POST request. POST requests can contain huge amounts of data that will add load 
to the server where the portal is running on.
Shibboleth uses the HTML Forms to transfer information between the different servers and 
clients. 
The Secure Sockets Layer Protocol (SSL) is a protocol developed by Netscape  designed 
to provide privacy between two communicating applications (a client  and a server)  by 
using public key cryptography. Second, the protocol is designed to authenticate the server 
and, optionally, the client. SSL requires a reliable transport protocol (for example TCP) for 
data transmission and reception.
An advantage of the SSL protocol is that it's application protocol independent  (Fig. 4.8). 
An application level protocol (for example HTTP, FTP, Telnet, etc.) can layer on top of the 
SSL protocol transparently. The SSL protocol negotiates an encryption algorithm and a 
session key as well as authenticates a server before the application protocol transmits or 
receives it's first byte of data. 
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Fig. 4.8: SSL Details
All  application  protocol  data  is  encrypted  before  transmission,  ensuring  privacy.  The 
connection provided by the SSL protocol has three main properties:
-The  connection  is  private.  All  messages  are  encrypted  using  secret  key 
cryptography (for example DES, RC4, etc.) with a session key that is decided at the 
beginning with an initial handshake.
-The identities can be  authenticated  using public key cryptography (for  example 
RSA, DSS, etc.). The server endpoint of the conversation is always authenticated, 
while client endpoint authentication is optionally.
-The connection is reliable. The protocol includes a message integrity check using a 
Message  Authentication  Code  (MAC)  ensuring  that  package  alteration  between 
client and server is detected. The MAC is calculated using secure one-way hash 
functions (for example SHA, MD5, etc.).
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Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the latest enhancement of SSL. The TLS protocol is 
based on the SSL 3.0 protocol specification as published by Netscape. The differences 
between this protocol and SSL 3.0 are not dramatic, but they are significant enough that 
TLS  1.0  and  SSL  3.0  do  not  interoperate.  The  major  changes  are  cryptographically 
stronger  MAC computation,  larger  padding (up to  256 instead of  63 bytes)  and some 
protocol clean-up (for example ignoring unknown record types, improved alert messages, 
etc.).
The OpenSSL project offers an Open Source implementation of the SSL/TLS protocols. 
Shibboleth use SSL to transfer information between servers encrypted and protect the 
“sensible” information.
4.5 SOAP
SOAP is very new and there is not much history to it but I will go into how it was initiated 
and got the support of several big vendors in the business. SOAP began at Microsoft as 
XML-RPC, created by Dave Winer back in 1998. It was developed to replace the existing 
RPC's on the market that were not suited for use over the Internet.
Other protocols (such as DCOM) required a significant dedicated runtime support. They 
also  had  problems  with  several  firewalls  that  didn’t  support  access  via  non-  HTTP 
protocols. Later on they changed the name from XML-RPC to the more generic Simple 
Object Access Protocol. The first draft was heavily linked to Microsoft technology and used 
Microsoft’s Biztalk server software but in the later version 1.1 it supported the W3C’s XML 
schema standard.
SOAP is a XML based way to send and receive information over a network such as the 
Internet. With the right software support such as the Jakarta Tomcat server you will get the 
ability  to  do Remote Procedure Call  (RPC) with  your  XML messages and receive the 
information back to you in a XML message. There are different ways to use this; in it's 
easiest form you use a web browser to access an on-line site that provides you with an 
interface to call the objects. The technical solutions are hidden behind the web interface. 
Another  way  to  utilize  SOAP is  to  incorporate  it  in  an  application  and  use  the  XML 
messages to send information to a server containing the objects used in the application. 
The application is then only an empty shell that resides on your local computer allowing 
the calls to be made to the server where the objects and the data are stored. In this way all 
the clients don’t  have to be replaced when changes in the objects are done. Also it's 
possible to ensure that the data is stored in a safe environment and accessed only as 
intended. 
SOAP was developed with two major design goals:
-Provide a standard object  invocation protocol  built  on Internet  standards,  using 
HTTP as the transport and XML for data encoding.
-Create an extensible protocol and payload format that can evolve.
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HTTP was chosen as the primary application layer protocol for SOAP since it works well 
with today's Internet infrastructure, specifically, SOAP works well with network firewall .
XML was chosen as the standard message format because of it's widespread acceptance 
by major corporations and opensource development efforts. Additionally, a wide variety of 
freely available tools significantly ease the transition to a SOAP-based implementation.
The somewhat lengthy syntax of XML can be both a benefit and a drawback. it's format is 
easy  for  humans to  read,  but  can be complex  and slow down processing  times.  For 
example,  GIOP and DCOM use much shorter,  binary message formats.  On the other 
hand,  hardware  appliances  are  available  to  accelerate  processing  of  XML messages. 
Binary  XML  is  also  being  explored  as  a  means  for  streamlining  the  throughput 
requirements of XML.
A SOAP message is contained in an envelope. Within this envelope are two additional 
sections:  the  header  and  the  body  of  the  message.  SOAP  messages  use  XML 
namespaces. The header contains relevant information about the message. For example, 
a header can contain the date the message is sent, or authentication information. It is not 
required, but must always be included at the top of the envelope when it's present.
An example of how a client might format a SOAP message requesting product information 
from  a  fictional  warehouse  web  service.  The  client  needs  to  know  which  product 
corresponds with the ID 827635.
 <soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
   <soap:Body>
     <getProductDetails xmlns="http://warehouse.example.com/ws">
       <productID>827635</productID>
     </getProductDetails>
   </soap:Body> </soap:Envelope>
Here  is  how  the  warehouse  web  service  might  format  it's  reply  message  with  the 
requested product information.
 <soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <soap:Body>
    <getProductDetailsResponse xmlns="http://warehouse.example.com/ws">
      <getProductDetailsResult>
       <productName>Toptimate 3-Piece Set</productName>
        <productID>827635</productID>
        <description>3-Piece luggage set.  Black Polyester.</description>
        <price>96.50</price>
        <inStock>true</inStock>
      </getProductDetailsResult>
    </getProductDetailsResponse>
  </soap:Body> </soap:Envelope>
Shibboleth use SOAP as a definition of how to use XML to transfer data between the 
servers.
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4.6 PKI. Public Key Infrastructure
In  the  physical  world,  face-to-face  transactions,  photo  identification  and  even  written 
signatures offer some protection against fraud. However, the Internet remains relatively 
anonymous,  making  it  harder  to  know  who  is  at  the  other  end  of  the  network.  The 
challenge is to translate the trust conventions from the physical to the on-line world. A 
Public  Key  Infrastructure  (PKI)  (Fig.  4.9) has  become  the  de  facto  standard  for 
establishing this trust over electronic networks.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a system of digital certificates and Certificate Authorities 
that verify and authenticate the validity of each involved party.
Certificate Authority (CA) is an authority in a network that issues and manages security 
credentials and public keys for message encryption and signature verification.
A  digital  certificate  consists  of  the  public  key  and  the  identity  of  an  entity,  rendered 
unforgeable by digitally signing the entire information with the private key of the issuing 
Certificate Authority (CA).
The name Public Key Infrastructure is used because Certificate Authorities issue digital 
certificates by signing public keys.
A public key is a value that can be used to effectively encrypt messages and verify 
digital signatures.
The  public  key  can  be  made  publicly  available,  it  does  not  contain  secret 
information. All secret information is stored within the corresponding private key.
A private key is a value - known only to one party - that can be used to decrypt 
encrypted messages, issue digital signatures and compute the corresponding public 
key. 
Fig. 4.9: Public Key Infrastructure components
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The private key must  be kept  private and must  not be made publicly available. 
Together, a private and a public key form a key pair.
The most important services of a Certificate Authority are:
-Key  Registration:  Issuing  a  new Certificate  for  a  public  key  after  verifying  the 
identity of the person demanding the Certificate.
-Certificate Revocation: Cancelling a previously issued Certificate. This is usually 
done when a private key is corrupted.
-Key Selection: Obtaining a party's public key. The CA provides the corresponding 
public key if someone asks for a specific identity.
-Trust Evaluation: Determining whether a Certificate is valid and what operations it 
authorizes.
Shibboleth use a PKI infrastructure to establish a trust environment where the federations 
can work.
4.8 XML (eXtensible Markup Language)
XML,  an  acronym  for  eXtensible  Markup  Language,  was  derived  from  Standard 
Generalized Markup Language (SGML). A document written in XML is said to be well 
formed  if  the  tag  structure  is  equivalent  to  a  balanced  tree.  Unlike  HTML,  the  tag 
vocabulary of XML is unrestricted. Users can create arbitrary tags that can have arbitrary 
meanings.
The only syntactic constraint XML imposes on it's users is that valid XML documents must 
conform to a pre-defined Document Type Definition (DTD) or XML Schema. DTD's and 
XML Schemas describe the structure of an XML document. XML processors (or parsers) 
perform  XML  document  validation  using  the  schema  to  reference  tag  structure 
descriptions. XML Schemas were recently introduced by the World Wide Web consortium. 
The  syntax  is  similar  to  XML documents  in  that  they  must  represent  balanced  trees. 
However,  the tag vocabulary of  schemas is restricted to well  defined set of  tags. This 
thesis primarily deals with XML files that use schemas rather than DTD's.
A schema is composed of entities known as schema components. In all,  there are 13 
different  schema  components  that  fall  into  three  different  groups  namely,  primary 
components, secondary components and helper components. 
Primary components include the following:
-Simple  Type  Definitions:  determine  constraints  on  element  and  attribute 
declarations. The content model of simple types can contain pre-defined datatypes 
as well as other simple types. Simple type definitions, if named, must be unique.
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-Complex Type Definitions: also constrain element and attribute declarations. Unlike 
simple types, the content model of a complex type can include other simple and 
complex  type  definitions  or  declarations  in  addition  to  pre-defined  datatypes. 
Complex types also introduce the notion of type derivation. 
Every  complex  type  definition  is  derived  either  by  restricting  a  complex  type 
definition or by extending a simple or complex type definition. Type derivation will be 
discussed shortly. Complex type definitions, if named, must be unique.
-Element Declarations: associate a name with a simple or complex type definition.
-Attribute Declarations: associate a name with a simple type definition.
Secondary components include the following:
-Notation declarations: associate a name with an identifier for a notation.
-Model group declaration:  is an association between a name and a model group. 
Model  groups constrain the order and cardinality of a list of element declarations. 
There are three different types of model groups, namely:
·Sequence:  Element  declarations  in  the  XML  file  must  follow  a  specific 
sequence defined by the sequence model group.
·Choice: Element declarations in the XML file can have an arbitrary order and 
cardinality. This is the equivalent of a logical disjunction.
·All: Element declarations in the XML file must have all elements specified in 
this model group. This is the equivalent of a logical intersection.
-Attribute  group  definitions: associate  names  with  attribute  groups.  An  attribute 
group contains a set  of  attribute declarations that  are included in  complex type 
definitions as a group.
-Identity-constraint definitions: associate names with uniqueness and
reference constraints.
Helper components are the following:
-Particles: include an element, wildcard or group declaration followed by occurrence 
constraints. They impose cardinality constraints on content model declarations.
-Wildcard: is  a  special  case  of  a  particle  definition  that  includes  an  additional 
namespace constraint.
-Attribute Uses:  used in an attribute declaration to specify whether that particular 
attribute is required or allowed.
-Model Groups: provide for a more refined definition of complex content models.
XML Schemas use a restricted tag set to describe the structure of an XML document. XML 
schemas are syntactically constrained to form a balanced tree (for example, every starting 
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tag must have a corresponding closing tag). XML schemas encompass a wide range of 
features. 
-Type Derivation:  This is similar to class-subclass relationships. A type derivation 
that has the same schema components as another type definition and restricts the 
range values of these entities is said to be a restriction. Restriction applies to both 
simple  and complex  types.  A  type derivation  that  includes additional  content  in 
addition to the content model of an existing type is said to be an extension. As 
simple types cannot have additional simple or complex content types, only complex 
types can be derived by extension. An element of type A that has been derived from 
a type B, by restriction is also an element of type B. This mirrors class-subclass 
relationships where a class A is said to be a subclass of class B if every member of 
class A is  also a member of  class B.  However,  this  similarity  is  limited to  type 
derivations by restrictions. An element of a type A, derived by extension of type B, is 
not necessarily an element of type B.
-Namespaces:  XML schemas require that the set of type definitions and elements 
are  said  to  be  locally  unique  in  a  domain  name  known  as  a  namespace. 
Namespace is known as a qualified name and must be globally. Such namespaces 
are known as target namespaces. If  no namespaces are defined, then a default 
namespace (www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema) is assumed by a schema validator. A 
namespace identifies the location of the schema document that contains the precise 
definition of the element declaration or type definition. As XML does not have any 
restriction on the XML tag vocabulary, it's  entirely possible for  different users to 
conjure up tags with different meanings but identical names. However, using the 
namespace facility, each user can define the element/type definition in a schema 
that serves as a namespace. Prefixing the namespace schema to element names 
ensures that a schema validator can access the proper definition and perform an 
accurate validation.
XML allows any type of data to be encoded as there are no restrictions on XML tags. The 
only constraint it enforces is that a well formed and valid XML document conform to an 
DTD  or  schema,  for  example,  it  requires  that  the  XML  file  adhere  to  a  pre-defined 
grammar.  In  any communication  protocol,  both  sides  must  have a  consistent  protocol 
description. In the case of XML, both sides need access to the schema to process XML 
data. Note that the schema only provides a syntactic description of data.
The semantics provided by a schema is extremely limited. If we assume that web users all 
over the world will use the same terms to describe entities, then parsing a XML file will 
yield both syntactic and semantic information. In the context of controlled domains where 
users agree on common standards, this however becomes a reasonable assumption. This 
is a naive assumption to make for the web. As we shall see in the following section, RDF 
overcomes these limitations to a great extent and can represent semantics more efficiently 
than XML.
Shibboleth uses the XML file format in all the configuration files.
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4.9 SAML (Security Assertions Markup Language)
SAML,  an  OASIS standard,  is  a  standard XML-based framework  for  the  exchange of 
attributes, authentication and authorization information. Prior to SAML, there was no XML 
based standard that enabled exchange of security information between a security system 
(such as an authentication authority) and an application that trusts the security system. 
SAML provides a standard XML schema (Fig. 4.10) for specifying authentication, attribute, 
and  authorization  decision  statements,  and  it  additionally  specifies  a  WS-based 
request/reply protocol for exchanging these statements. 
SAML is designed to keep your information with only a few selected parties and allowing 
those parties to share that information with other interested parties, if required, after your 
explicit approval. This means that your information is safe in the hands of parties you trust, 
plus you can have access to a range of higher-level services offered by vendors that bring 
together a multitude of lower-level services.
The primary objectives of SAML are:
-Create an authentication and authorization exchange mechanism that is protocol- 
and platform-independent (SSO).
-This should be independent of the deployment environment and should work with 
centralized, decentralized, and federated deployment scenarios.
-The SAML framework should be XML-based. SAML is a mechanism for controlling 
access to resources for authenticated principals. Access to resources is managed 
based on specific policies. Two key actions are required for such a mechanism:
- Decisions about access control based on policies.
- Enforcing those decisions.
Fig. 4.10: SAML Diagram
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SAML provisions two roles to handle these actions: Policy Decision Points (PDP's) and 
Policy Enforcement Points (PEP's).
Scenario: The subject is interested in accessing some secured content from a target Web 
site. The subject goes to the source Web site that recognizes the subject or has already 
authenticated the subject. From the source site, the user tries to access secured content 
on the target Web site, taking the following steps:
1. Subject authenticates to the source site and requests a link to target site’s 
secured resource.
2. Source site redirects to the subject using the authentication token.
3. Subject makes a request to the target site for the secured resource using the 
token.
4. Target site’s PEP checks permission with the PDP.
5. PDP may  internally  request  the  source  site  for  the  SAML  authentication 
assertion using the token.
6. The source site provides an SAML authentication assertion to the target site 
based on the token.
7. Target site provides the secured resource to the subject.
In all, a subject having been authenticated at the originating site gets a token from the 
SAML authority that it provides to the target site. The target site uses the token to request 
the information it needs from the originating site without having to get it explicitly from the 
subject.
The SAML specification is made up of the following components:
-Assertion and protocol: This specification addresses the syntax and semantics for 
defining XML-encoded assertions as well as the request and response protocols.
-Bindings  and  profiles:  This  specification  addresses  the  mapping  of  SAML 
request/response message exchange onto lower layer communication protocols like 
SOAP or SMTP. A set of rules that govern embedding and extracting the SAML 
information from lower layer communication protocols is called a profile.
-Conformance specifications: Different SAML implementations may only implement 
part of these specifications. Conformance specifications set the basic standards to 
which an implementation of the SAML specification must conform before it can be 
called  a  conformant  implementation.  This  helps  with  interoperability  and 
compatibility.
-Security and privacy considerations: This specification covers the security risks in 
the SAML architecture specifically, the way SAML addresses those risks and the 
risks that are not addressed.
Assertions  provide  information  about  the  authentication  performed  by  the  subjects, 
attributes  of  subjects,  and  authorization  decisions  about  whether  or  not  subjects  are 
allowed to access certain resources. 
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A set of assertions makes a profile of a subject. Assertions in a profile set may be from 
different organizations. The three assertion types are:
-Authentication: Authentication assertion deals with authentication of a
subject by a specific mechanism at a particular time.
-Attribute: Attribute  assertion  provides  a  mechanism  for  associating  specific 
attributes with a given subject.
-Authorization decision: Authorization decision assertion manages a given subject’s 
authority to access resources.
SAML  authorities  produce  assertions.  SAML  authorities  can  be  further  specified  as 
authentication authorities,  attribute authorities,  or  PDP's.  Consumers of  assertions can 
either  be  clients  or  SAML  authorities  themselves.  This  is  an  example  of  a  SAML 
Response. The fields are explained after.
<Response>
<ResponseID>dynadi:2003-02-20:5aff53b33d7a78c4</ResponseID>
<InResponseTo>access:2003-02-20:1e5638a2bbd3180a</InResponseTo>
<IssueInstant>2003-02-20T09:12:15</IssueInstant>
<Assertion>
<AssertionID>dynadi:2003-02-20:777a35f6b3ac638b</AssertionID>
<Issuer>urn:com:ibm:zurich:dynadi</Issuer>
<IssueInstant>2003-02-20T09:11:07</IssueInstant>
<SubjectStatement>
<Subject>
<NameIdentifier>john_smith@domain.org</NameIdentifier>
</Subject>
</SubjectStatement>
<AuthenticationStatement>
<AuthenticationMethod>urn:ietf:rfc:2246</AuthenticationMethod>
<AuthenticationInstant>2003-02-20T09:10:59</AuthenticationInstant>
</AuthenticationStatement>
</Assertion>
</Response>
IDType. This basic data type declares identifiers for assertions, requests and responses. 
Values of this type are supposed to be chosen uniquely  such that no party accidentally 
assigns the same identifier to a different data object. The IDReferenceType is used to refer 
to instances of IDType.
Assertion.  An Assertion is a package of information that supplies one or more statements 
made by an issuer. An Assertion contains the following major elements:
-AssertionID [IDType, required] Identifies the assertion.
-Issuer [String, required] The name of the issuer of the Assertion.
-IssueInstant [UTC, required] The time instant of issue.
-Statement  [Statement, one or more] A Statement about a subject made by  the 
issuer.
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Statement.  The Statement element is an abstract extension point  for  different kinds of 
concrete  Statements.  The  most  important  derived  concrete  elements  are  Subject 
Statement and Authentication Statement. 
Subject Statement.  This Statement contains a Subject element that
allows an issuer to describe a subject. The Subject element itself has the following
structure:
-Name Identifier An identification of a subject by a name and security domain.
-Subject Confirmation Information that allows the subject to be authenticated. If the 
Subject  contains  the  Subject  Confirmation  in  addition  to  a  NameIdentifier,  the 
relying  party  can  perform  the  Subject  Confirmation  to  verify  that  the  entity 
presenting the assertion is the one that the issuer identifies with the Name Identifier.
Authentication  Statement. The  issuer  states  that  the  subject  was  authenticated  by  a 
particular means at a particular time.
Attribute Statement. The issuer states that the specified subject is  associated with the 
specified attributes.
Request. The requester sends a message of type Request to a SAML  responder. The 
Request inherits different elements from Request Abstract Type.
-RequestID  [IDType,  required] Identifies  the  request.  If  present  the  Response 
corresponding to the Request must contain it's value in the InResponseTo element.
-IssueInstant [UTC, required] The time instant of issue of the request.
-Query Specifies the query to be answered by the SAML responder.
-AssertionArtifact [String, one or more] Contains a so-called SAML artifact, which is 
a String handle and represents a specific assertion.
Response. The  Response  element  specifies  the  message  sent  back  by  the  SAML 
responder.
-ResponseID [IDType, required] Identifies the response.
-InResponseTo  [IDReferenceType, optional] Refers to the Request the  Response 
corresponds to.  If  the RequestID of the Request can be determined, it  must be 
present.
Shibboleth is a set of  SAML profiles,  is a functioning SAML instantiation for  federated 
administration, with privacy management built into the design. The Appendix C shows the 
assertion schema.
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4.10 Attribute-Based Authorization
Typical user authentication methods only provide the application with the permanent user 
identifier  (user_id)  of  the  person  who  has  authenticated.  This  simple  approach  won’t 
suffice  in  modern  systems.  Applications  need  additional  information  about  users-user 
attributes to make proper authorization decisions. Providing this information as part of the 
sign-on process is especially useful in multi-organizational situations where an application 
probably won’t have access to user information through other means such as a directory 
service. Shibboleth is designed specifically to provide user attributes to applications with 
the  flexibility,  extensibility,  security,  and  privacy  required  in  federated  scenarios. 
Organizations  can  use  Shibboleth’s  built-in  attribute  support  (based  on  the 
Internet2/EDUCAUSE eduPerson directory schema or create new attributes to meet the 
needs of applications. For example, attributes can represent “entitlements” such as “user 
is authorized to access resource collection X.”
The  Attribute  Based  Authorization  is  the  main  concept  that  Shibboleth  is  based.  The 
Shibboleth IdP software plugs in to existing institutional identity management and user 
information services (typically Lightweight Directory Application Protocol, or LDAP-based, 
directories), extending them to work inter-organizationally.
4.11 User attributes
User attributes are the basis for how the target site makes it's authorization decisions. In 
Shibboleth,  attributes are usually name/value pairs relevant to the user. Shibboleth also 
provides for hidden attributes relevant to the origin and target site, but not necessarily to 
the user. 
Shibboleth places a large emphasis on user privacy. However, Shibboleth target sites are 
greedy and will  try to obtain as many of  the user’s attributes as possible.  To balance 
access and privacy, Shibboleth allows it's users a choice in what information gets released 
about them and to which site. To achieve this balance, Shibboleth lets each user have an 
Attribute Release Policy (ARP). 
When the SHAR at the target site asks the AA at the origin site for attributes for the user 
with  a  specific  handle,  the  AA retrieves  that  user’s  ARP and  only  releases attributes 
consistent with that policy. Shibboleth ARP's consist of a list of entries, each with three 
main fields: a destination SHAR name, a resource URL, and a list of attributes that can be 
released to this SHAR and URL (if the user has these attributes and the SHAR wants 
them). The SHAR is usually the Website where the URL resides and which hosts the 
resource. As noted earlier, the origin site might have hidden attributes, such as a contract 
number, and an institution-specific ARP to specify when they should be released. Thus, 
the AA may serve to add additional attribute values into the Attribute Response Message 
(ARM) sent to the SHAR. 
Since is not possible for a user and her institution to be able to provide ARP's for  every 
possible target resource on the Internet, and every SHAR and URL pairing, Shibboleth 
permit's default and wildcarded ARP's.
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The Shibboleth standard requires that  the AA must  provide users at  the origin side a 
configuration file by which they can specify their Attribute Release Policies, this is usually 
done using a GUI such as a web browser and enables the user to control his own privacy. 
The downside, of course, is that a user’s choice of ARP may not be proper to be able to 
grant him access to a target resource. Due to this problem, it's often preferable for the user 
to be aware of each site’s attribute requirements, possibly shown on the interface.
The Problem is that Shibboleth defines the basic structure and use of an ARP. However, 
how the AA retrieves a user’s ARP is not part of the Shibboleth standard and is left open to 
interpretation. The user may have a single ARP or multiple ARP's. They may be dispersed 
throughout the organization or they may be collected in one place. How the user’s ARP is 
retrieved, validated and enforced is left to the implementers. The Shibboleth draft states: 
“AA implementers are free to support many different kinds of ARP's with varying semantics 
as long as the AA can efficiently process requests and determine the effective policy to 
apply...Shibboleth doesn’t  specify  or  constrain  how an AA can answer  these kinds  of 
questions.”
In  a  typical  Higher  Education  Institute  (HEI),  the  lines  of  administrative  control  are 
dispersed Furthermore, the structure of this distribution will vary from user to user. In a 
typical HEI, it also likely that the decision procedure for attribute release will follow such 
administrative lines.
<user-attribute>
      <description>User Given Name</description>
      <name>user.name.given</name>
   </user-attribute>
   <user-attribute>
      <description>User Last Name</description>
      <name>user.name.family</name>
   </user-attribute>
   <user-attribute>
      <description>User eMail</description>
      <name>user.home-info.online.email</name>
</user-attribute>
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CHAPTER 5: SHIBBOLETH IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 Introduction
Now we know more in depth about Shibboleth, the goal is to develop a real scenario (Fig. 
5.11) where to be able to put the characteristics of Shibboleth on approval, so we left from 
a scene with 3 machines.
The first machine lodged the services of identification (IdP), the second machine lodged 
the content that we want to protect (SP) and the third machine acted properly as a client. 
The requirements of the last one are simply to have a navigator and connection to the 
network in which the rest of machines are. The machines act like IdP and SP are the one 
that runs properly Shibboleth, these are the machines which needs special characteristics. 
These  3  machines  are  x86  all  of  them  and  they  do  not  require  special  hardware 
characteristics. We left from the base that the 3 are connected through their respective 
networks to Internet although in this case the institution and network are common, it's not 
mandatory.
Fig. 5.11: Scene of tests
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In  this  chapter,  first  I  start  to  explain  the  pre-requirements  and  co-requisite  to  install 
Shibboleth in IdP and SP (I have already commented previously the client does not have 
special characteristics) and later the configuration of the machines to work with, in the 
desired scenario.
5.2 Requirements
Since Shibboleth is middleware, needs of software on which runs (O.S.) and that upon 
does interaction with system /  client (Web server,  web applications, database, another 
middleware, etc.). The (Fig. 5.12) shows the working layering for Shibboleth.
Beginning by the low layer,  we needed system operative where to work,  normally  for 
implementation of Shibboleth is used Freebsd or Linux, also it allows that some of their 
functions run on machines under Windows, Solaris and Mac-Os.
For the scenario, I use Linux (Gentoo 2005.1) for the Service Provider and BSD (Freebsd 
RC5.4) for the Identify Provider.
The SP runs with Linux (Gentoo) because it's the OS that I have in my machine and I'm 
more close to them. (For the SP it's necessary some requirements and some of them are 
in portage and the another's are only possible to install from scratch). I use this machine 
for the SP because in this machine is were are going to run the applications for the student 
(e-learning environment contents, etc) and for me it's more easy install and deploy this 
applications in a familiar environment. 
The IdP runs under BSD (Freebsd) because it was a new machine and Freebsd allows me 
a fast installation of the system and also a good support on case of difficulties, another 
added  reason  was  the  fact  of  test  Shibboleth  running  under  Freebsd  because  the 
institution for which I'm developing the project normally works in most of her machines with 
them.
Fig. 5.12: Software Layering
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About  the  web  server,  I  start  to  work  with  the  Apache  branch  1.3  because  in  the 
Shibboleth documentation recommends the use of 1.3 for best support but I quickly switch 
to 2.0 due to the incompatibility of 1.3 with some Apache new modules needed for the 
deployment and the absence or instability of some of them with the 1.3 branch (now, in the 
last versions of the Shibboleth docs also speak about 2.0).
In the SP the Web server is necessary to be able to offer the contents to the users (page 
Web, document, graph, etc.) and to allow to establish rules of access to this content, later 
is through these rules where grants/deny Shibboleth the access.
In  the  IdP  the  Web  server  is  necessary  for  the  remote  authentication  in  the  system 
(campus, library, etc.) and to pass the password of the SSO to Tomcat. For the rest of 
Web  server  functions  Tomcat  replaces  Apache.  If  it's  necessary,  is  possible  to  work 
without Apache in the IdP.
About  Tomcat,  the  branch  has  been  used  is  the  5.0  although  according  to  the 
documentation also it's possible to use branch 5.5, I chose the first because have better 
support in the used systems.  Tomcat, only is necessary in the IdP, and the purpose it's to 
manage the jar applications where Shibboleth are deployed.
Another of the requisites for the implementation is the LDAP server. In this database are 
located the login,  password and attributes of  the user of  the system.  It's the base of 
Shibboleth, is where we will be able to know who is that user, its roll, the resources who 
can access, etc.
I choose Openldap because have an easy implementation and are available in the portage 
packages of Gentoo. The ldapserver runs in the IdP machine but it's possible to use a 
existing ldap server of the institution or use another database like Mysql, Postgres, etc.
This is the Idif I use to fill the database:
dn: dc=fh-luebeck,dc=de
dc: fh-luebeck
objectClass: dcObject
objectClass: organization
o: VFH-Luebeck
dn: cn=anne, dc=fh-luebeck,dc=de
userPassword:: e1NIQX1YQzNaUk4zcDRJaUJ2dkNKVCtleUtseWNTd1k9
description: biology
objectClass: top
objectClass: person
sn: lenna
cn: anne
For the Shibboleth development I use 3 attributes:
-cn and userPassword: Used by the SSO to login in the system.
-description: This field contains the courses where the user are joined.
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5.3 Deploying
In order to test the implementation of Shibboleth I improve a simplified solution is shown in 
the figure  (Fig. 5.13). Although it was in the beginning a bit complex, especially by the 
subject of the service of WAYF and the Federation, once finished the installation and for 
the final tests, both have been suppressed. The objective is the control of the access to 
the resources (document,  webpage,  image,  etc.)  hosted in the SP, the policy and the 
attributes  for  the  access  to  the  resource  are  defined  in  Apache  in  the  httpd.conf 
configuration file. 
The names of user, passwords and attributes are located in a LDAP server. This minds all 
the specific data about the users is located in a centralized database this allows a better 
control of “the sensible” data of user with which it improves the privacy. To this database, 
that circumstantially located in the SP machine it's possible can be defined access policies 
so  that  it  could  be  accessible  from the  IdP  machine  as  well  as  from the  SP for  his 
management.
Fig. 5.13: Scenario Overview
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5.3.1 IdP (Origin)
For the development of the IdP, after the Freebsd installation, and all the requirements 
(openssh, apache+modules, Tomcat), and the configuration of Tomcat and the Apache 
modules, the Shibboleth install program copies the .war to the directory of webapps, is 
when Tomcat starts when the war file is installed and appears the resource /Shibboleth-
idp/. In the figure (fig 5.14) can be observed a scheme of the IdP installation.
The following step is properly the configuration of Shibboleth that consists of 3 files: 
-idp.xml: Contains the main configuration of  the IdP. Aside the configuration of  
federation and the certificates the important points are the situation of the AA  
AAUrl="https://vfhmapc45.fh-luebeck.de:8443/shibboleth-idp/AA" 
and the file used to access to the attributes.
resolverConfig="file:/usr/local/shibboleth-idp/etc/resolver.ldap.xml"
Fig. 5.14: IdP Software Structure
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-resolver.ldap.xml: In this file, is configured  that I want to use an LDAP server for 
get the attributes and  the location of the server.
<JNDIDirectoryDataConnector id="directory">
<Search filter="cn=%PRINCIPAL%">
<Controls searchScope="SUBTREE_SCOPE" returningObjects="false" />
</Search>
<Property name="java.naming.factory.initial"
 value="com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapCtxFactory" />
<Property name="java.naming.provider.url" value="ldap://vfhmapc46.fh-
luebeck.de:389/dc=fh-luebeck,dc=de" />
</JNDIDirectoryDataConnector>
 and which attributes they must be available. In the file I ask for all the registries  
available but the really important ones are these (initials and description).
<SimpleAttributeDefinition id="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:initials">
<DataConnectorDependency requires="directory"/>
</SimpleAttributeDefinition>
<SimpleAttributeDefinition id="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:description">
<DataConnectorDependency requires="directory"/>
</SimpleAttributeDefinition>
-arp.site.xml:  This file  contains the sending policy attributes from the  IdP.  This 
allows  send the attributes to any target (any SP).
<Target>
<AnyTarget/>
</Target>
I define send 3 attributes (cn, sn and description). Its also possible to define another 
attributes depending the rules or the scenario.
<Attribute name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:sn">
         <AnyValue release="permit"/>
</Attribute>
<Attribute name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:cn">
         <AnyValue release="permit"/>
</Attribute>
<Attribute name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:description">
         <AnyValue release="permit"/>
</Attribute>
It's also possible to define policies depending on the user  or SP  who ask for them. 
For example if the SP is from the own institution its possible to release more details 
of the user than if the SP is a public library that only needs if this user have grants 
or not.
In the Appendix E there are some explanations about how to install and configure the IdP 
side of Shibboleth.
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5.3.2 SP (Target)
For the SP deployment, the steps are a bit complicated because the SHAR of Shibboleth 
depends of a lot of other software:
-Xerces-C: Is a validating XML parser designed to give an application the ability to 
read  and  write  XML  data.  Provides  a  shared  library  for  parsing,  generating, 
manipulating,  and validating XML documents.  Shibboleth uses this  to  work with 
XML files.
-Log4cpp: Is a library of C++ classes for flexible logging to files, syslog, and other 
destinations. Shibboleth uses this to log the activities.
-XML-Security: Library developed by the Apache project with the aim of work with 
XML in a secure way. Shibboleth use this to manage secure XML files.
-Opensaml: Is a set of open-source libraries in Java and C++ which can be used to 
build,  transport,  and  parse  SAML  messages.  OpenSAML  is  able  to  store  the 
individual information fields that make up a SAML message, build the correct XML 
representation, and parse XML back into the individual fields before handing it off to 
a  recipient.  OpenSAML supports  the  SOAP binding  for  the  exchange of  SAML 
request and response objects (C++ supports requesting only).  Shibboleth use this 
to support the SAML assertions.
The last step is compile the Shibboleth source code. If everything was ok, now to start the 
server it's necessary to start the shar always before start apache.
<path_shibboleth_install>/bin/shar -f &
A detail of the SP software structures is shown in the figure (Fig. 5.15).
Fig. 5.15: SP Software Structure
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The 3 basic files of configuration are:
-shibboleth.xml:  This  file  contain  the  basic  configuration  of  the  SP,  the  session 
lifetime, the wayf location (In this case, there are no wayf and this points to the SP) 
and the location of the shire.
<Sessions  lifetime="7200"  timeout="3600"  checkAddress="true" 
wayfURL="https://vfhmapc45.fh-luebeck.de/shibboleth-idp/SSO" 
shireURL="/Shibboleth.shire" shireSSL="false"/>
-aap.xml: This file contain the configuration of the attributes to receive and the bind 
with the local attributes. Also this configuration allows to release this attributtes to 
any SP.
<AttributeRule  Name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:description" 
Header="Shib-Person-enrolled" Alias="enrolled">
<AnySite>
            <AnyValue/>
        </AnySite>
</AttributeRule>
In  the file  binds the attribute description with  the alias enrolled.  This  binding is 
needed for apache. Binds is the “attribute that apache knows.”
-http.conf:  This  file,  aside  the  configuration  of  the  webserver  contains  the 
configuration of the folders to protect.
These are the lines concerning to Shibboleth.
<Location /electronics>
  AuthType shibboleth
  ShibRequireSession On
  require enrolled electronics
</Location>
“enrolled” it's the bind of the description in the ldap database and electronics the 
attribute needed for grant the access to the electronics folder
In the Appendix F there are some explanations about how to install and configure the SP 
side of Shibboleth.
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5.3.3 Federation and WAYF
I start the deploying joining to a federation called InQueue, InQueue it's a test federation 
environment and it's helps to test the deploy (provide some tools that for example show 
with kind of attributes are send, etc). In the beginning, every time I want to access to a 
resource the browser shows this screen and  the user needs to select the own IdP. This 
drawing shown a snapshot  of the wayf service for InQueue (Fig. 5.16).
Because in the scenario are only one IdP, i don't use federation and the wayf check is 
omitted. Now the SP knows in which IdP are needed to login, because this, in the SP 
configuration, instead of point to a wayf service, point directly to the IdP.
The configuration files in the Appendixes are also valid for the InQueue Federation.
Fig. 5.16: InQueue WAYF Service
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CHAPTER 6: E-LEARNING APPLICATIONS AND SHIBBOLETH
6.1 Introduction to the CMS (Course Management Systems)
Many universities have been using a Course Management System (CMS) for a few years 
now. A Course Management System is a web based application (Fig. 6.17) through which 
students and teachers can interact. Course documents such as presentation sheets and 
assignments are made available to the students by the teacher, and students can work on 
assignments in groups and take on-line tests.
There is no agreed upon definition or even one single term for CMS's. Other terms used 
are  Virtual  Learning  Environments  (VLEs),  Managed  Learning  Environment  (MLE), 
Learning Management System (LMS) and Learning Support System (LSS).
Fig. 6.17: CMS Snapshot
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6.2 Shibbolize a e-learning application
Shibbolize  is  the  process  of  adding  Shibboleth  to  an  application.  Primary should  be 
possible to Shibbolize most of the web applications with the condition of  knows how works 
inside and the availability of the source code.
Shibboleth  has  been  mainly  designed  for  exchanging  authorisation  attributes  across 
institutions  using  a  secure  and  devolved  model,  where  users  are  authenticated  and 
authorised against their own institutional access management system (IdP). Its scope is 
wider than an institution itself,  being very suitable for  scenarios where the universe of 
users does not necessarily belong uniquely to one institution. 
Within an institutional context, integration of Shibboleth into CMS or portal (Most of them 
are linked with the access portal of the institution) might be done in at least two different 
approaches. The easiest way it's natively but most of the times it's not possible because 
this  software  exists  before  Shibboleth.  A  second  option  is  the  integration    with  the 
institutional authentication system explained in the chapter 2 (WebISO, PubCookie and 
authorisation system (for example role-based authorisation supported by LDAP).
The  former  approach  uses  Shibboleth  in  a  WebISO  fashion  and  extends  the  default 
mechanisms. Shibboleth is powerful enough to be used as a native system to provide SSO 
authentication and authorisation within an institution.
The latter approach typically uses a WebISO system already deployed and integrated with 
the institutional Portal and other resources and services. This leaves the WebISO system 
to provide SSO across the institution for the Portal as if it  was any other SSO-enabled 
Web-based resource/ service. The WebISO authentication point has to be 'Shibbolized' 
(acting as a SP), at least for all users not coming from a security domain internal to the 
institution.
For users succeeding to authenticate,  all  the attributes associated with the user might 
have to be fetched and associated with the WebISO SSO session. In the case of a portal, 
one of the attributes has to be a unique and permanent identifier such as username, e-mail 
address or something more pseudonymous (like an e-mail address).
The purpose of  this  chapter  is  explore the  possibilities of  Shibbolize  two of  the  CMS 
applications used in on-campus and others like Moodle that should be a good alternative.
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6.3 Blackboard
Blackboard CMS is a software product from Blackboard Inc.  Blackboard develops and 
licenses  enterprise  software  applications  and  related  services  to  over  2200  education 
institutions  in  more  than  60  countries.  These  institutions  use  Blackboard  software  to 
manage e-learning courses. 
Blackboard is used to support flexible teaching and learning in face-to-face and distance 
courses.  It  provides  tools  and  facilities  for  on-line  course  management,  content 
management  and  sharing,  assessment  management,  and  on-line  collaboration  and 
communication. 
Blackboard provides instructors with the following functions:
• Announcements 
• Course Content 
• Tests/Quizzes 
• Surveys 
• Discussion Boards 
• Chat Rooms 
• Broadcast Email 
• Grade book Management 
• Assignment Collection 
Some of the advantages of Blackboard are:
– Customizable Course Menu & Buttons.
– Content Types:
– Assignments
– Learning Units
– Copy and Move Course Content:  Course content can be copied or moved to 
another place within the course, or to another course entirely.
– Linking Content and Tools: Content and tools can be linked to other areas within 
the course. 
– External Link Editor.  Allows URLs for external links to be placed anywhere in 
content areas.
– WYSIWYG (rich text) editor available for PC users. 
Regarding  the  Blackboard  documentation,  Shibboleth  is  fully  supported  as  a  custom 
authentication option for Blackboard Learning System on UNIX operating systems. In the 
Appendix  H  there  are  some  explanations  about  how  to  configure  Blackboard  to  use 
Shibboleth.
52                                                                                                              Shibboleth   and the challenge of authentication in multiple servers   
6.4 Sakai
The Sakai Project is a community source software development effort to design, build and 
deploy a new Collaboration and Learning Environment (CLE) for higher education. The 
Project began in January, 2004. 
The Sakai Project has it's origins at the University of  Michigan and Indiana University, 
where both universities independently began open source efforts to replicate and enhance 
the functionality of their existing CMSs .Soon after, MIT and Stanford joined in and, along 
with the Open Knowledge Initiative (OKI)  and the uPortal  consortium, and a generous 
grant  from the Mellon Foundation,  they formed the Sakai  Project.  The Sakai  Project's 
primary goal is to deliver the Sakai application framework and associated CMS tools and 
components  that  are  designed  to  work  together.  These  components  are  for  course 
management,  and,  as  an augmentation of  the original  CMS model,  they  also support 
research collaboration. The software is being designed to be competitive with the best 
CMS's available. 
The tools are being built  by designers,  software architects  and developers at  different 
institutions, using an experimental variation of an open source development model called 
the community source model. To provide a support system for institutions that want to be 
involved in the Sakai Project, either by adopting Sakai tools or by developing tools for 
inter-institutional  portability,  the  Sakai  Project  has  also  formed  the  Sakai  Educational 
Partners Program (SEPP) and the Sakai Commercial Affiliates Program.
The  Sakai  Project  follows  what  is  called  the  community  source  model,  which  is  an 
extension to the already successful, economically feasible, open source movement forged 
by projects such as Apache, Linux,  and Mozilla.  Based on the goal of  addressing the 
common  and  unique  needs  of  multiple  institutions.  community  source  relies  more  on 
defined roles,  responsibilities,  and funded commitments  by  community  members,  than 
some open source development models.
 
To date, the Sakai Project has put out three major software releases (1.0, 1.5 and 2.0), 
developed an Educational Partner's Program which now has around 80 members around 
the world with 14+ active discussion groups and five commercial affiliates, organized three 
highly  successful  SEPP  conferences,  and  successfully  demonstrated  a  model  for 
community source software development among colleges and universities.
Some of the advantages of Sakai are:
– easy-to-use interface.
– notify users of new content via email .
– export calendar events as PDF. 
– create online assignments: allow students to submit text based assignments or 
upload a file for review .
– subscribe to RSS feeds: allows instructors to display syndicated content from 
other websites. 
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– manage multiple files simultaneously: allows instructors to upload or delete more 
than one file at a time .
– display web content from within the course site: provide easy access to web 
resources by adding links to the navigation panel.
In the future, the Sakai Project expects to continue it's effort to build out it's interoperable 
framework and develop many new tools and extensions. In addition, the Partner's Program 
will continue to grow and the development model used for Sakai is expected to become 
more broadly applicable.
About Shibbolize Sakai, the only information that I found is that there are some efforts to 
Shibbolize but at the end of this work the results are not published.
6.5 Moodle
Moodle is a course management system, designed specifically to manage internet-based 
educational courses. The design is influenced strongly by progressive ideas of educational 
theory such asocial constructionism. Is the creation of Martin Dougiamas, PhD student at 
Curtin University, Perth, Australia. This research project started in 2000. The first public 
release of Moodle, version 1.0, was released on August 20, 2002. In 2003 the company 
moodle.com was  launched,  offering  professional  support  and  management  of  Moodle 
installations. Currently, the project is at version 1.5, with a large number of features added 
since the first release.
Moodle can be used in a very wide range of environments, ranging from fairly restrictive 
web hosting  providers  to  institutional  servers.  It  requires  PHP 4.1.0  with  GD to  work 
properly, and is regularly tested on Linux, Unix, Windows, Mac OS X and Netware servers. 
It contains complete support for MySQL and PostgreSQL, and support for other databases 
is very easy to add. Only a single database is required, and Moodle can share this with 
other applications (using table prefixes). The PHP code has been designed to be readable 
and hackable by people with only  medium programming skills.  Administration is made 
easy with a unique self-upgrading system (no more .sql files!).
A  modular  authentication  design  allows  Moodle  to  be  "hooked  up"  to  external 
authentication services such as LDAP, IMAP, POP3, NNTP, or arbitrary database tables 
(for example a Postnuke user table). It also supports traditional email authentication and 
instant guest accounts. 
The site itself is very customisable. Themes allow you to customise the look using CSS 
and HTML. The front page can consist  of  a blog-style news forum, or a list of course 
descriptions, or a list of course categories (departments) with abbreviated course names. 
Courses themselves can be one of three predesigned layouts (weekly, topics, or social) 
and are built up by the teacher by adding activity modules using an intuitive interface. 
Activities include assignments, choices, forums, journals, resources, quizzes, and surveys. 
Chat and peer-graded assessments are in development, with a tracker module coming 
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soon after  that.  Each of  these modules is very customizable and contains a range of 
expanding features.
Other features include comprehensive user profiles with pictures, centralised gradebook, 
detailed logging and displays of user activity, teacher forums, and teacher customisation of 
things  like  access  policies,  naming  (for  example  instead of  "teacher"  and "student"  a 
teacher might prefer using "professor" and "participant") and so on. 
Lastly,  Moodle  features  complete  localization  has  already  been  translated  into  20 
languages  including  Arabic,  Catalan,  Chinese,  Dutch,  English  (UK  and  US  versions), 
Finnish, French, German, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Norwegian, Portuguese, Spanish 
(Spain, Mexico and Caribbean versions), Swedish, Thai and Turkish. 
The project has grown substantially, with many users and developers participating in the 
community at Moodle.org.
Using Moodle with Shibboleth authentication has the following advantages:
-Access to Moodle can be restricted very accurate.
-User accounts are created automatically as soon as a user login the first time.
-The user profiles are set up automatically.
-The user profiles can automatically kept up-to date all the time.
-So you don't have to care anymore for user management issues because this is 
basically handled by the Identity Provider of the Shibboleth user.
-Once  Shibboleth  users  are  authenticated,  they  can  access  other  Shibboleth-
enabled  resources  without  login  in  another  time.  Due  to  this  single  sign-on 
mechanism, they for example can jump from one Moodle installation to another or 
the  can  access  a  Shibboleth-protected  library  or  a  web  shop,  always  being 
authenticated.
-Future automatic course enrollement according to Shibboleth attributes.
According to the last documentations, Moodle is Shibboleth enabled. Just needs some 
configurations and teach the users. There are some guidelines in the Appendix I.
Conclusions and Improvement Proposals                                                                                                                                                     55  
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPROVEMENT 
SUGGESTIONS
7.1 Discussion
During the development  of  this work,  a first  approach, reading and learning about  the 
possible  and  suitable  scenarios  for  Shibboleth,  was  made.  Furthermore,  the  software 
requirements that could help to understand how to deploy an scenario with this type of 
technology were studied. Some important concepts of security in networks were studied, 
and it  helped to  understand why Shibboleth was the correct  solution for  the expected 
requirements of on-campus (The e-learning environment at the Fachhochschule Lübeck). 
But to be able to have a general overview of the solutions, some alternatives to Shibboleth 
were studied.  Even though these ones did not  fulfil  the requirements or  were already 
implemented in Shibboleth. 
Later,  a  deeper  Shibboleth  study  was  made,  which  included  all  components  and  the 
function of every one of them. Once understood Shibboleth, since is a global solution and 
include in its development some other technologies it was necessary to explore this other 
protocols and software on which it was based, is for this reason that I had to learn about 
each one of the technologies before start the Shibboleth deployment. 
After the theoretical study of Shibboleth, the deployment and the test of each one of the 
components  was made to  evaluate  their  performance in  a  separately  way.  When the 
different parts worked separately, all the design was deployed together. This was one of 
the  most  complicated  parts,  which  finished  when  a  basic  example  work  using  this 
scenario. The main challenge now was that Shibboleth offers very powerful surroundings, 
it  was  necessary  to  make  it  work  with  applications  of  CMS  and  thus  to  be  able  to 
demonstrate all its power. 
Then a learning about the CMS concept was needed and the integration with a CMS 
started. Later specific efforts in commercial CMS, were made, in terms of learning about 
how to Shibbolize (integrate with Shibboleth) a CMS. Finally, and once tested all, some 
captures of the traffic were made to evaluate the behaviour of Shibboleth, placing special 
attention to the lower levels of Shibboleth. 
7.2 Conclusion
Shibboleth is a complex piece of software, and its installation is likely to stretch many 
institutions,  particularly  when  it  comes  to  set  up  the  infrastructure  needed  for  it.  It  is 
essential to plan the process carefully, and to ensure that enough time is allocated. 
The skills required are an advanced knowledge of system admin, experience in installing 
software, and also in handling a Web server configuration. The difficulty of understanding 
Shibboleth  is  heightened  by  the  out-of-date  nature  of  the  documentation  of  the 
architecture. Most of the information is in the distribution mailing-list. 
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The Shibboleth software generally  seems to  work fine,  once configured correctly.  The 
obvious  area  to  improve  with  respect  to  make  easier  the  software  installation  is  the 
documentation, some time it was difficult to found answers because its in deployment and 
normally the people works and solve the problems themselves.
About the last test and the capture traffic, there is not much to explain because all the 
traffic captured was encrypted through the TLS protocol, the only remarkable thing would 
be some packets of the requests to the LDAP server.
Having  worked  during  some  months  with  Shibboleth,  one  of  the  conclusions  is  that 
Shibboleth it’s a very good system for big universities, groups of investigation or big users 
networks since  it  allows,  for  example,  to  work  with  a  structure of  common data base 
(eduPerson), the different management of IdP by means of the WAYF and the possibility 
of being upgradeable.  It does not have limits in the number of SP and IdP. Another goal is 
the possibility to create federations so that networks of trust settle down. 
However, and although once the system was mounted, everything worked without hardly 
maintenance,  the  implementation  in  small  surroundings,  like  the  one  that  has  been 
created, is not so advantageous; firstly because all the potential does not take advantage 
of Shibboleth and also because the assembly is a laborious process.
A good point  of  start  is  if  all  the servers of  the network in  which is  wanted to mount 
Shibboleth are administered by the same people I believe that he is not worth the trouble 
Shibboleth and should be better use more simple systems.  The potential of Shibboleth is 
in administrating groups that are different,  because it  establishes really good bases to 
manage it all, and it is much more easy to reach compatibility and a mutual working.
7.3 Future Work and improvement suggestions
During the development of this project and after working for a couple of months there are 
some improvement proposals.
One of the things that has not been fully implemented is the integration of Shibboleth with 
Sakai since it's not yet finished. Although this should not be very difficult because Sakai is 
open software and there is a lot of people working on that. 
At  the other side Blackboard is already Shibbolized,  maybe because there are lots of 
economic motivations behind them. Nevertheless, there are some other tools like Moodle 
that has been Shibbolized, provably in not so much time there are available the code to 
Shibbolize Sakai. 
Another of the things to improve, is the change of version 1.2 to version 1.3 since many 
concepts  have  been  deprecated  and  much  has  been  simplified,  one  of  the  biggest 
changes has been the adaptation to complain with the standard   OpenSaml v. 2.0, this 
has  caused  that  many  concepts  of  base  totally  must  be  reformulated  and  the 
documentation not yet reflects it.
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APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY
A.1 Abbreviations
AAA Authentication, Authorization, Accounting
ACL Access Control List
CMS Course Management System
HEI Higher Education Institute 
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LDIF LDAP Data Interchange Format
OASIS Organization for  the Advancement  of  Structured Information  
Standards
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RFC Request for Comments
SAML Security Assertion Markup Language
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol
SSL Secure Socket Layer
SSO Single Sign-on
TGS Ticket Granting Service
TLS Transport Layer Security
XML Extensible Markup Language
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A.2 Terminology
AAP The  Attribute  Acceptance  Policy  define  the  rules  that 
map attributes and information out of the SAML attribute assertion into simpler forms that 
are usable by the application for policy decisions. These rules may also provide filters on 
who is allowed to assert certain information. 
AA The Attribute Authority (deprecated) is the portion of the 
IdP responsible for issuing attributes on behalf of an organization. This term has been 
deprecated, and the AA is now the attribute query protocol handler function in the IdP. 
Access Control Access control is the process of denning and enforcing 
(rules,  procedures)  to  prevent  unauthorized  access  to  resources.  Authentication  and 
authorization are central parts of access control.
Access Control List  Format for specification of an Access Matrix. The Access
Control List is attached to a resource. It contains users, groups and permissions
that they have on the resource.
Assertion A statement that is taken as being correct or true.
Authentication Authentication  is  the  process  of  providing  assurance 
regarding the identify of a subject or an object.
Authorization Authorization  is  the  process  of  determining  whether  a 
particular subject has permission to manipulate a certain object in a certain way.
Attribute An attribute is an atom of information which is defined by 
the intersection of  attribute name and attribute value. Attributes must be considered in 
terms of the subject about which they are asserted and the authority who is asserting the 
atom of information is true. 
Attribute Assertion A SAML attribute assertion carries attribute information 
about a subject such as a browser user. In Shibboleth, the attribute assertion conveys 
attributes once a context is established from the IdP to the SP. 
ARP Attribute Release Policies are rulesets regarding attribute 
release. These are combined and matrixed against the requester to compute an effective 
ARP. The effective ARP filters the set of attributes supplied by the directory released to a 
given relying party by the IdP.
Attribute Resolver The  component  of  the  IdP  responsible  for  retrieving 
attributes from various data sources or computing advanced attributes and performing the 
necessary transformations for SAML transport. 
Authentication Assertion SAML  authentication  assertions  carry  information 
regarding  the  act  and  results  of  the  authentication  of  a  principal  by  an  authority.  In 
Shibboleth, this is used to transport the handle or other form of name identifier to the SP 
for authentication or subsequent attribute request. 
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Certificate A certificate consists of the public key and the identity of 
an entity rendered unforgeable by digitally signing the entire information with the private 
key of the issuing Certificate Authority (CA).
Certificate Authority A Certificate Authority (CA) is an authority in a network 
that issues and manages security credentials and public keys for message encryption.
Digital Certificate A digital certificate is an electronic means of establishing 
your credentials when doing business or other transactions on the Internet. It 
is  issued  by  a  certification  authority  (CA).  It  contains  your  name,  a  serial  number, 
expiration dates, a  copy of  the certificate holder's  public  key (used for  encrypting and 
decrypting messages and digital signatures), and the digital signature of the certificate-
issuing authority so that a recipient can verify that the certificate is real.
Digital Signature A digital signature is an electronic signature that can be 
used to authenticate the identity of the sender of a message or the signer of a document 
and,  possibly,  to  ensure  that  the  original  content  of  the  message  or  document  is 
unchanged. Digital signatures are easily transportable and cannot be imitated by someone 
else. The ability to ensure that the original signed message arrived means that the sender 
cannot repudiate it later.
EduPerson This  object  class  was defined by  MACE-Dir  to  handle 
standard educational attributes in a way that would facilitate collaboration. Shibboleth is 
often used to transport eduPerson attributes, but the two are distinct entities and each can 
be used individually with full functionality. 
Entitlement  Entitlements  form  a  specialized  class  of  attributes 
important  enough  to  call  out  separately.  They  can  be  used  to  identify  specific  group 
membership or eligibility to use a given resource. One method of deploying Shibboleth 
insulates  the  decision  making  logic  used  by  the  IdP  from  the  SP  by  expressing 
entitlements instead of several individual attributes. 
Handle A handle is one form of name identifier and is used in an 
authentication assertion to establish a referential  identifier for  attribute query in classic 
Shibboleth. The handle itself is completely opaque and temporary and should never be 
directly used for authentication purposes, as it corresponds only to a particular unknown 
browser user. 
HS Handle Service (deprecated)  is,  the  portion of  the IdP 
responsible for handling single sign-on interoperability and functionality. 
Federation A federation is a collection of organizations that agree to 
interoperate  under  a  certain  ruleset.  Federations  will  usually  define  trusted  roots, 
authorities, and attributes, along with distribution of metadata representing this information. 
Shibboleth treats federations -- representing multiple relying parties -- like single relying 
parties. Federations are not required for the use of Shibboleth but can facilitate exchange 
greatly. 
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IdP/Origin The  Identity  Provider  is  the  authority  responsible  for 
generating  and  asserting  authentication,  authorization,  and  identity  information  about 
principals in a security domain. 
LDAP Lightweight  Directory  Access  Protocol,  a  protocol  for 
accessing directory services. Set of protocols used to access a hierarchical directory of 
information on a directory server. LDAP is considered to be lightweight because it's based 
on  a  simplified  version  of  X.500  directories.  Directories  may  contain  phone  numbers, 
electronic mail  addresses, Public Key's,  computer names and addresses, or  any other 
information that can be conveniently arranged hierarchically.
Metadata Shibboleth relies on metadata to identify and distribute 
trusted IdP, SP, and certificate authority information. Prior to 1.3, this took the form of 
sites.xml  and  trust.xml;  now  only  sites.xml,  based  on  the  new  SAML  2.0  metadata 
standards, is used. 
Name Identifier There  are  several  different  name identifiers,  each one 
representing a different meaning for the Subject field of the SAML authentication assertion, 
and often, a different set of flows as well. Handles are the name identifier in traditional 
Shibboleth  flows,  and  actual  identities  or  persistentID's  may  also  be  used  either  for 
attribute transport or as standalone sign-on assertions. 
Principal The  individual  being  authenticated  and  about  whom 
assertions are being issued. Note the principal of an assertion is only the subject of the 
assertion in cases where identity is directly expressed. 
Private Key A private key is a value - known only to one party - that 
can be used to decrypt  encrypted messages, issue digital signatures and compute the 
corresponding public key. The private key must be kept private and must not be made 
publicly available. This term is most often used in the context of public key cryptography 
and not in the context of traditional cryptography.
ProviderID The atom of trust implementation for both the SP and IdP 
is the providerID of the corresponding partner in a transaction. Often this will be assigned 
by  federations,  but  at  other  times  individual  providers  will  define  their  own.  Common 
names may be used in addition to providerID's for UI purposes. 
Public Key A public key is a value that can be used to effectively 
encrypt  messages and verify  digital  signatures.  The public  key  can be  made  publicly 
available, it does not contain secret information.
Public Key Cryptography Public  key  cryptography  is  the  science  of  information 
security that uses private key and public key pairs for encryption, decryption and signature 
creation and verification. The problem of the key distribution is solved because the public 
key can be made publicly available, just the private key is kept as a secret. RSA is an 
example of a public key crypto system.
Relying Party The relying party is defined per-flow and is always the 
provider receiving and utilizing information from another entity in a given flow. Generally, 
this will be a particular SP. 
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Role The  actions  and  activities  assigned  to  or  required  or 
expected of a person or an entity.
Resource A resource in  our  sense can be a piece of  data  or  a 
service provided by a system.
SAML Artifact A small piece of data that refers non-ambiguously to a 
SAML Assertion. 
SAML Assertion A  piece  of  data  that  formalizes  an  assertion  about  a 
subject’s identity or attributes. It regards either an act of authentication performed on a 
subject, attribute information about the subject, or authorization  permission   applying to 
the subject with respect to a specified resource. 
SP/Target  The Service Provider is an entity authorized to request 
attributes about IdP users on behalf of a relying organization. 
SHAR The Shibboleth Attribute Requestor (deprecated) was the 
component  of  the  SP responsible  for  requesting  attributes  about  a  browser  user  with 
whom a handle had already been associated, but is now a part of the SP package as a 
whole. 
SHIRE The  Shibboleth  Indexical  Reference  Establisher 
(deprecated)  is responsible for helping to associate a browser user with an identifier that 
the IdP and SP can both refer to. It is now part of the SP package.
Sign-on The process of authentication to a system.
Single Sign-on A user logs in at a Source Site and authenticates to that 
site. The Source Site confirms an identity of the user to other sites (Destination Sites). The 
user only needs to authenticate to the Source Site and does not need to identify at each 
Destination Site.
Transport Layer Security A  protocol  that  generates  secure  point-to-point 
connections. The connections provide confidentiality and integrity as well as freshness and 
robustness measures. Unilateral or bilateral authentication is possible. The successor of 
SSL.
Web Service A  Web  Service  is  a  self-describing,  self-contained, 
modular application. It provides some functionality to other applications through an Internet 
connection.
66                                                                                                              Shibboleth   and the challenge of authentication in multiple servers  
Appendixes                                                                                                                                                                                                   67  
APPENDIX B: Security Overview Solutions
Fig. B.18: Overview of Security Solutions
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APPENDIX C: SAML Assertion schema
Fig. C.19: SAML Assertion Schema
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APPENDIX D: Step by step Shibboleth work flow
Phase A:Connect to Resource
1.-The  user  Timo,  connect  her  browser  with  a  WBR  (fh-
hambourg.de/resource.pdf) located in another university. 
2.-The server hands the request over SHIRE and redirect the webbrowser to the 
WAYF list (fh-germany.de/list_of_univ.html). 
3.-The user selects from a list her university (vfh.luebeck.de). 
Fig. D.20: Shibboleth. Phase A
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Phase B:Authentication in the home University
4.-WAYF redirects (depending of the option selected) the browser to the HS of 
the university. 
5.-The HS send the  login  screen  that  Timo  normally  use  for  access  to  the 
contents of her lessons (SSO). 
Fig. D.21: Shibboleth. Phase B
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Phase C:Redirection to the University Resource
6.-Timo send to the server the credentials (login and password). 
7.-If the credentials are ok the HS generate a Handle containing info about the 
resource (no user data) and its send to the SHIRE.
Fig. D.22: Shibboleth. Phase C
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Phase D:Shibboleth Authentication
8.-The SHIRE receive the Handle and its send to the SHAR and the SHAR sends 
via https to the AA. 
9.-The AA verifies the Handle and ask to the ARP with attributes its possible to 
send (are digitally signed). 
Fig. D.23: Shibboleth. Phase D
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Phase E:SP Authorized Access
10.-The SHAR passes the attributes to the ACM ant this authorize  Timo the 
access to the WBR (fh-hambourg.de/resource.pdf.) now,  Timo can access the 
(authorized)  resources  in  another university  in  a  transparent  way (until  the 
auth. expires). 
Fig. D.24: Shibboleth. Phase E
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APPENDIX E: IdP Installation procedure and configuration files
idp.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!-- Shibboleth Identity Provider configuration -->
<IdPConfig 
xmlns="urn:mace:shibboleth:idp:config:1.0" 
xmlns:cred="urn:mace:shibboleth:credentials:1.0" 
xmlns:name="urn:mace:shibboleth:namemapper:1.0" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mace:shibboleth:idp:config:1.0 
../schemas/shibboleth-idpconfig-1.0.xsd" 
AAUrl="https://vfhmapc45.fh-luebeck.de:8443/shibboleth-idp/AA" 
resolverConfig="file:/usr/local/shibboleth-idp/etc/resolver.ldap.xml"
defaultRelyingParty="urn:mace:inqueue" 
providerId="urn:mace:inqueue:fh-luebeck.de">
<RelyingParty name="urn:mace:inqueue" signingCredential="inqueue_cred"
schemaHack="true"> 
<NameID nameMapping="shm"/>
</RelyingParty>
<ReleasePolicyEngine>
<ArpRepository 
implementation="edu.internet2.middleware.shibboleth.aa.arp.provider.FileSystemAr
pRepository">
<Path>file:/usr/local/shibboleth-idp/etc/arps/</Path>
</ArpRepository>
</ReleasePolicyEngine>
    <Logging>
<ErrorLog  level="DEBUG"  location="file:/usr/local/shibboleth-
idp/logs/shib-error.log" />
<TransactionLog  level="INFO"  location="file:/usr/local/shibboleth-
idp/logs/shib-access.log" />
</Logging>
Fig. E.25: IdP Software Prerequisites
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<!-- Uncomment the configuration section below and comment out the one 
above if you would like to manually configure log4j -->
    <!--
<Logging>
<Log4JConfig location="file:///tmp/log4j.properties" />
</Logging> -->
<NameMapping 
xmlns="urn:mace:shibboleth:namemapper:1.0" 
id="shm" 
format="urn:mace:shibboleth:1.0:nameIdentifier" 
type="SharedMemoryShibHandle" 
handleTTL="28800"/>
<ArtifactMapper 
implementation="edu.internet2.middleware.shibboleth.artifact.provider.MemoryArti
factMapper" />
<Credentials xmlns="urn:mace:shibboleth:credentials:1.0">
<FileResolver Id="inqueue_cred">
<Key>
<Path>file:/usr/local/etc/apache2/ssl.certs/server.key</Path>
</Key>
<Certificate>
<Path>file:/usr/local/etc/apache2/ssl.certs/server.crt</Path>
</Certificate>
</FileResolver>
</Credentials>
<ProtocolHandler 
implementation="edu.internet2.middleware.shibboleth.idp.provider.ShibbolethV1SSO
Handler">
<Location>https?://[^:/]+(:(443|80))?/shibboleth-idp/SSO</Location> 
</ProtocolHandler>
<ProtocolHandler 
implementation="edu.internet2.middleware.shibboleth.idp.provider.SAMLv1_Attribut
eQueryHandler">
<Location>.+8443/shibboleth-idp/AA</Location>
</ProtocolHandler>
<ProtocolHandler 
implementation="edu.internet2.middleware.shibboleth.idp.provider.SAMLv1_1Artifac
tQueryHandler">
<Location>.+8443/shibboleth-idp/Artifact</Location>
</ProtocolHandler>
<ProtocolHandler 
implementation="edu.internet2.middleware.shibboleth.idp.provider.Shibboleth_Stat
usHandler">
<Location>https://[^:/]+(:443)?/shibboleth-idp/Status</Location>
</ProtocolHandler>
<MetadataProvider 
type="edu.internet2.middleware.shibboleth.metadata.provider.XMLMetadata"
                uri="file:/usr/local/shibboleth-idp/etc/IQ-metadata.xml"/> 
</IdPConfig>
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resolver.ldap.xml
<AttributeResolver xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xmlns="urn:mace:shibboleth:resolver:1.0" 
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mace:shibboleth:resolver:1.0 shibboleth-resolver-
1.0.xsd">
<SimpleAttributeDefinition id="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:cn">
<DataConnectorDependency requires="directory"/>
</SimpleAttributeDefinition>
<SimpleAttributeDefinition id="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:sn">
<DataConnectorDependency requires="directory"/>
</SimpleAttributeDefinition>
<SimpleAttributeDefinition id="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:descritption">
<DataConnectorDependency requires="directory"/>
</SimpleAttributeDefinition>
 
<JNDIDirectoryDataConnector id="directory">
                <Search filter="cn=%PRINCIPAL%">
               <Controls searchScope="SUBTREE_SCOPE" returningObjects="false" />
                </Search>
<Property name="java.naming.factory.initial" 
value="com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapCtxFactory" />
                <Property 
name="java.naming.provider.url"value="ldap://vfhmapc46.fh-luebeck.de:389/dc=fh-
luebeck,dc=de" />
        </JNDIDirectoryDataConnector>
</AttributeResolver>
arp.site.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<AttributeReleasePolicy  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xmlns="urn:mace:shibboleth:arp:1.0" 
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mace:shibboleth:arp:1.0 shibboleth-arp-1.0.xsd" >
<Description>Simplest possible ARP.</Description>
<Rule>
<Target>
<AnyTarget/>
</Target>
<Attribute name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:eduPersonAffiliation">
<AnyValue release="permit"/>
</Attribute>
<Attribute  name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-
def:eduPersonScopedAffiliation">
<AnyValue release="permit"/>
</Attribute>
  <Attribute name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:sn">
         <AnyValue release="permit"/>
  </Attribute>
<Attribute name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:cn">
         <AnyValue release="permit"/>
  </Attribute>
<Attribute name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:description">
         <AnyValue release="permit"/>
</Attribute>
</Rule>
</AttributeReleasePolicy>
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APPENDIX F: SP Installation procedure and configuration files
Installation Procedure with gentoo
XERCES-C
export XERCESCROOT=<full path to xerces-c-src2_6_0>
cd $XERCESCROOT/src/xercesc
autoconf
/runConfigure -p linux -c gcc -x g++ -r pthread -b 32 -P /opt/shibboleth
make 
make install
LOG4CPP 
 ./configure --prefix=/opt/shibboleth --with-pthreads --disable-static
make
make check
make install
XML-Security 
./configure --prefix=/opt/shibboleth --without-xalan
make
make install
OPENSAML
./configure  --prefix=/opt/shibboleth  --with-curl=/usr/lib   --with-
xerces=/usr/local/include  --with-log4cpp=/opt/shibboleth  --with-
openssl=/usr/lib -C
make
make install
SHIBBOLETH
./configure  --prefix=/opt/shibboleth  --with-log4cpp=/opt/shibboleth  --
with-xerces=/opt/shibboleth --with-saml=/opt/shibboleth  --enable-apache-
20 --with-apxs2=/usr/sbin/apxs2 -C
make
make install
Fig. F.26: SP Software Prerequisites
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82                                                                                                              Shibboleth   and the challenge of authentication in multiple servers  
shibboleth.xml
<ShibbolethTargetConfig xmlns="urn:mace:shibboleth:target:config:1.0"
    logger="/opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth/shibboleth.logger" clockSkew="180">
    <Extensions>
        <Library path="/opt/shibboleth/libexec/xmlproviders.so" fatal="true"/>
    </Extensions>
    <SHAR logger="/opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth/shar.logger">
<!--
        <Extensions>
            <Library  path="/opt/shibboleth/libexec/shib-mysql-ccache.so" 
fatal="false"/>
        </Extensions>
        -->
    
    
        <UnixListener address="/tmp/shar-socket"/>
                <MemorySessionCache cleanupInterval="300" cacheTimeout="3600" 
AATimeout="30" AAConnectTimeout="15"
            defaultLifetime="1800" retryInterval="300" strictValidity="false" 
propagateErrors="true"/>
        <!--
        <MySQLSessionCache  cleanupInterval="300"  cacheTimeout="3600" 
AATimeout="30" AAConnectTimeout="15"
               defaultLifetime="1800" retryInterval="300" strictValidity="false" 
propagateErrors="true"
               mysqlTimeout="14400">
            <Argument>&#x2D;&#x2D;language=/opt/shibboleth/share/english</Argume
nt>
            <Argument>&#x2D;&#x2D;datadir=/opt/shibboleth/data</Argument>
        </MySQLSessionCache>
        -->
    </SHAR>
    
    <SHIRE logger="/opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth/shire.logger">
          <RequestMapProvider 
type="edu.internet2.middleware.shibboleth.target.provider.XMLRequestMap">
            <RequestMap applicationId="default">
               
                <Host name="localhost">
                    <Path  name="secure"  requireSession="true" 
exportAssertion="true">
                    
                    <Path name="admin" applicationId="foo-admin"/>
                </Path>
                </Host>
            </RequestMap>
        </RequestMapProvider>
        
        <Implementation>
            <ISAPI normalizeRequest="true">
            
                <Site id="1" name="localhost"/>
            </ISAPI>
        </Implementation>
    </SHIRE>
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    <Applications xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion"
    id="default" providerId="https://vfhmapc46.fh-luebeck.de/shibboleth">
        
       <Sessions lifetime="7200" timeout="3600" checkAddress="true"
                wayfURL="https://vfhmapc45.fh-luebeck.de/shibboleth-idp/SSO" 
    shireURL="/Shibboleth.shire" shireSSL="false"/>
<!-- WAYF      <Sessions lifetime="7200" timeout="3600" checkAddress="true"
                wayfURL="https://wayf.internet2.edu/InQueue/WAYF"
shireURL="/Shibboleth.shire" shireSSL="false"/>
-->
       
       
       <!--
        You should customize these pages! You can add attributes with values 
that can be plugged
        into your templates.
        -->
        <Errors shire="/opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth/shireError.html"
            rm="/opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth/rmError.html"
            access="/opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth/accessError.html"
            supportContact="humbertog.shibboleth@gmail.com"
            logoLocation="/shibtarget/logo.jpg"
            styleSheet="/shibtarget/main.css"/>
        </CredentialUse>
            
        
        <AAPProvider 
type="edu.internet2.middleware.shibboleth.target.provider.XMLAAP"
            <AttributeAcceptancePolicy xmlns="urn:mace:shibboleth:aap:1.0">
                <AttributeRule  Name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-
def:eduPersonPrincipalName" Header="REMOTE_USER" Alias="user">
                    <AnySite>
                        <AnyValue/>
                    </AnySite>
                </AttributeRule>
            </AttributeAcceptancePolicy>
        </AAPProvider>
        -->
        
             <FederationProvider 
type="edu.internet2.middleware.shibboleth.common.provider.XMLMetadata"
            uri="/opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth/IQ-sites.xml"/>
        <FederationProvider 
type="edu.internet2.middleware.shibboleth.common.provider.XMLMetadata">
<SiteGroup  Name="https://example.org/shibboleth" 
xmlns="urn:mace:shibboleth:1.0">
<OriginSite 
Name="https://example.org/shibboleth/origin">
<Alias>Localhost Test Deployment</Alias>
<Contact  Type="technical"  Name="Your  Name  Here" 
Email="root@localhost"/>
<HandleService 
Location="https://localhost/shibboleth/HS" Name="localhost"/>
<AttributeAuthority 
Location="https://localhost/shibboleth/AA" Name="localhost"/>
<Domain>localhost</Domain>
</OriginSite>
</SiteGroup>
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        </FederationProvider>
        
        <TrustProvider 
type="edu.internet2.middleware.shibboleth.common.provider.XMLTrust"
            uri="/opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth/IQ-trust.xml"/>
       
        <saml:Audience>urn:mace:inqueue</saml:Audience>
        
       
    </Applications>
    
    
    <CredentialsProvider 
type="edu.internet2.middleware.shibboleth.common.Credentials">
        <Credentials xmlns="urn:mace:shibboleth:credentials:1.0">
            <FileResolver Id="defcreds">
                <Key format="PEM">
                    <Path>/opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth/shar.key</Path>
                </Key>
                <Certificate format="PEM">
                    <Path>/opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth/shar.crt</Path>
                </Certificate>
            </FileResolver>
            
            <!--
            <FileResolver Id="inqueuecreds">
                <Key format="PEM" password="handsoff">
                    <Path>/opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth/inqueue.key</Path>
                </Key>
                <Certificate format="PEM">
                    <Path>/opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth/inqueue.crt</Path>
                </Certificate>
            </FileResolver>
            -->
        </Credentials>
    </CredentialsProvider>
</ShibbolethTargetConfig>
aap.xml
<AttributeAcceptancePolicy xmlns="urn:mace:shibboleth:1.0">
<AttributeRule  Name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-
def:eduPersonScopedAffiliation"  Scoped="true"  Header="Shib-EP-Affiliation" 
Alias="affiliation">
<!--  Filtering  rule  to  limit  values  to  eduPerson-defined 
enumeration. -->
        <AnySite>
            <Value Type="regexp">^[M|m][E|e][M|m][B|b][E|e][R|r]$</Value>
            <Value Type="regexp">^[F|f][A|a][C|c][U|u][L|l][T|t][Y|y]$</Value>
            <Value Type="regexp">^[S|s][T|t][U|u][D|d][E|e][N|n][T|t]$</Value>
            <Value Type="regexp">^[S|s][T|t][A|a][F|f][F|f]$</Value>
            <Value Type="regexp">^[A|a][L|l][U|u][M|m]$</Value>
            <Value Type="regexp">^[A|a][F|f][F|f][I|i][L|l][I|i][A|a][T|t][E|
e]$</Value>
            <Value  Type="regexp">^[E|e][M|m][P|p][L|l][O|o][Y|y][E|e][E|
e]$</Value>
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        </AnySite>
                        <SiteRule Name="urn:mace:inqueue:shibdev.edu">
        <Scope Accept="false">shibdev.edu</Scope>
        <Scope Type="regexp">^.+\.shibdev\.edu$</Scope>
        </SiteRule>
</AttributeRule>
<AttributeRule  Name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:eduPersonAffiliation" 
Header="Shib-EP-UnscopedAffiliation" Alias="unscoped-affiliation">
        <AnySite>
            <Value Type="regexp">^[M|m][E|e][M|m][B|b][E|e][R|r]$</Value>
            <Value Type="regexp">^[F|f][A|a][C|c][U|u][L|l][T|t][Y|y]$</Value>
            <Value Type="regexp">^[S|s][T|t][U|u][D|d][E|e][N|n][T|t]$</Value>
            <Value Type="regexp">^[S|s][T|t][A|a][F|f][F|f]$</Value>
            <Value Type="regexp">^[A|a][L|l][U|u][M|m]$</Value>
            <Value Type="regexp">^[A|a][F|f][F|f][I|i][L|l][I|i][A|a][T|t][E|
e]$</Value>
            <Value  Type="regexp">^[E|e][M|m][P|p][L|l][O|o][Y|y][E|e][E|
e]$</Value>
        </AnySite>
</AttributeRule>
    <AttributeRule  Name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:eduPersonPrincipalName" 
Scoped="true" Header="REMOTE_USER" Alias="user">
<!-- Basic rule to pass through any value. -->
        <AnySite>
            <Value Type="regexp">^[^@]+$</Value>
        </AnySite>
    </AttributeRule>
<AttributeRule  Name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:eduPersonEntitlement" 
Header="Shib-EP-Entitlement" Alias="entitlement">
<!-- Entitlements tend to be filtered per-site. -->
<AttributeRule  Name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:eduPersonTargetedID" 
Header="Shib-TargetedID" Alias="targeted_id">
        <AnySite>
            <AnyValue/>
        </AnySite>
</AttributeRule>
<AttributeRule  Name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:cn"  Header="Shib-Person-
commonName" Alias="usuari">
<AnySite>
            <AnyValue/>
        </AnySite>
</AttributeRule>
<AttributeRule  Name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:sn"  Header="Shib-Person-
surname">
<AnySite>
            <AnyValue/>
        </AnySite>
</AttributeRule>
<AttributeRule  Name="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:description" 
Header="Shib-Person-enrolled" Alias="enrolled">
<AnySite>
            <AnyValue/>
        </AnySite>
</AttributeRule>
</AttributeAcceptancePolicy>
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APPENDIX G: WAYF Installation instructions
To install the WAYF:
cd  /opt/src/shibboleth-origin-1.2 ant  package-wayf cp  dist/shibboleth-
wayf.war /usr/share/tomcat5/webapps/
To configure it:
cd /usr/share/tomcat5/webapps/shibboleth-wayf/WEB-INF/classes/conf/ 
cp IQ-sites.xml sites.xml
This creates a basic list  of two sites taken from the test federation, which we are just 
putting in to make the drop-down list have more than one thing in it. To this file, add our 
local test origin as follows:
<OriginSite Name="https://example.org/shibboleth/origin">
 <Alias>Localhost Test Deployment</Alias> <Contact Type="technical" 
Name="Your Name Here" Email="root@localhost"/> 
<HandleService Location="http://morbius.iay.org.uk/shibboleth/HS" 
Name="CN=localhost, O=Shibboleth Project, C=US"/> 
<AttributeAuthority  
Location="http://morbius.iay.org.uk/shibboleth/AA"  
Name="CN=localhost, O=Shibboleth Project, C=US"/> 
<Domain>
localhost
</Domain> 
</OriginSite>
At this point, it's possible to access the tomcat context directly to verify that something is 
happening:   http://vfhmapc48.fh-luebeck.de:8080/shibboleth-
wayf/WAYF?target=a&shire=b
To make  the  WAYF context  live  at  the  correct  URL,  add  the  following  clause  to  the 
/etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf in an appropriate place:
<Location /shibboleth-wayf>
 JkUriSet worker ajp13:localhost:8009 
</Location>
Finally, Is needed to make a change to the configuration of the local host “federation” from 
the point of view of the origin, as otherwise the origin will notice a providerId discrepancy 
and fail requests. 
To do this, edit /usr/share/tomcat5/webapps/WEB-INF/classes/conf/localhost-sites.xml and 
change  the  DestinationSite’s  AssertionConsumerServiceURL.  This  starts  out  as 
https://localhost/Shibboleth.shire but as I was browsing to my server from another host, Is 
needed  to  include  the  proper  machine  name:  http://vfhmapc48.fh-
luebeck.de/Shibboleth.shire. 
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APPENDIX H: Shibbolize Blackboard
The following section explains how to install Shibboleth and how to set up Shibboleth with 
the Installation.
1. Install Blackboard Learning System (Release 6) enable OpenSSL.
2. Configure SSL for  Blackboard Learning System.  Save the  certificate files 
under  blackboard/apps/httpd/conf/certs/.  These  are  formatted  as  .cer,  .crt 
and .key.
3. Download  the  correct  Shibboleth  package  for  the  operating  system  and 
install it. 
4. Follow the Shibboleth v1.1 instructions to install the package. Check that the 
most current libraries are installed. The Shibboleth directions contain detailed 
instructions for updating libraries.
The institution needs a signed CA certificate, for example, from Verisign. This is the same 
certificate used for SSL.
CONFIGURATION:
1. Edit  the  blackboard/apps/httpd/conf/httpd.conf  to  include  the 
/opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth/apache.config file. This step must be repeated 
when  PushConfigUpdates  is  run.  PushConfigUpdates  may  overwrite  this 
setting.
2.  Add  the  following  to  apache.config  in  the  Shibboleth  file  system.  This 
instructs  Shibboleth  to  protect  all  files  beginning  with  ‘/webapps’.  The 
apache.confing and.ini files are located in /opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth 
<Location /webapps>
AuthType shibboleth
require affiliation ~ ^member@.+$
# This rule below accepts any valid principal name passed from the
Origin.
require user ~ ^.+$
</Location>
3. The value of the “require” directive is dependent on the Attribute Acceptance 
and Attribute Release Policies for the Target and Origin, respectively. Check 
with the Shibboleth federation administration for details on what attributes will 
be released to your Target.
4. Add the following custom attributes to apache.config ShibMapAttribute urn 
mace dir attribute-def eduPersonPrincipalName Shib-EP-BBUSER-NAME. If 
you  configure  AJP13  as  the  Apache/Tomcat  protocol,  you may  omit  this 
value. Edit the Blackboard Tomcat server.xml to use AJP13 as the connector 
protocol. This should be done using the Ajp13Connector configuration. The 
AJP12  protocol  readers  in  Tomcat  have  a  bug  that  prevents 
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REMOTE_USER from being properly propagated to Tomcat from Apache. 
Additionally, the Coyote connectors have not been tested with Shibboleth.
For example (make sure you’ve disabled any other listeners that may be listening on the 
same port)
<Connector
className="org.apache.ajp.tomcat4.Ajp13Connector"
port="8009"
minProcessors="50"
maxProcessors="100"
tomcatAuthentication="false"/>
5. Edit /opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth/shibboleth.ini file to point to the correct WAYF 
server.  Shibboleth  should  default  to  the  correct  location  wayfURL  =  http 
//servername.blackboard.com  8080/shibboleth/HS  Point  to  the  location  of  the 
certificate file, the key file, calist and the password (omit the line breaks after the ‘=’)
certfile= 
/usr/local/blackboard/apps/httpd/conf/certs/server.crt
keyfile= 
/usr/local/blackboard/apps/httpd/conf/certs/server.key
calist=/usr/local/blackboard/apps/httpd/conf/certs/qa-b64.cer
keypass=‘password’
6.  Add  PEM-encoded  HS  certificate  to  the  trust.xml  file  in 
/opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth.  This  certificate  is  the  one  created  as  the  signing 
certificate of the origin.
<KeyAuthority>
<ds: KeyInfo>
<ds: X509Data>
<ds: X509Certificate>
Add PEM-encoded HS here
..
</ds: X509Certificate>
</ds: X509Data>
</ds: KeyInfo>
<Subject>qamigl2.qa.dc.blackboard.com</Subject>
</KeyAuthority>
7. Change the authentication type in Blackboard the Blackboard bb-config.properties 
file. bbconfig.auth.type=shib
8. Uncomment  all  the  Shibboleth  Authentication  Properties  in  the  Blackboard 
authentication.properties file.
9. Edit site.xml file under /opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth to point to a valid origin server. 
See example below.
<OriginSite Name="qamigl2.qa.dc.blackboard.com">
<Alias>Blackboard QA Testing Origin</Alias>
<Contact  Type="technical"  Name="John  Doe" 
Email="jdoe@blackboard.com"/>
<HandleServiceLocation="http://qamigl2.qa.dc.blackboard.com
8080/shibboleth/HS" Name="qamigl2.qa.dc.blackboard.com"/>
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<Domain>qa.dc.blackboard.com</Domain>
</OriginSite>
10.Start the  shar  executable on the Shibboleth server  /opt/shibboleth/bin/shar 
-f
11.Restart the Blackboard web services
 /usr/local/blackboard/tools/admin/ServiceController.sh services.restart 
Some considerations about certificates and keys:
-Certificates that are needed for Shibboleth:
-The certificate must be signed by an authority.
-If  a  Test  Certificate  is  used,  then  the  Administrator  must  coordinate  with 
representatives from Shibboleth to be added to the trusted list of institutions (this is 
referred to as In Queue)
Users of a system that participates in Shibboleth will go through the following steps to 
login:
1. Click Login on the Blackboard Learning System Login page.
2. Choose the institution from the drop-down list.
3. Enter login and password information and click Login.
4. Users  may  enter  the  URL  for  another  institution  that  participates  in 
Shibboleth and enter that school’s Web site.
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APPENDIX I: Shibbolize Moodle
The changes that would be necessary to extend the moodle code and file structure are 
(most of this is already described in moodle/auth/shibboleth/README.txt):
1. A  new  directory  has  to  be  created,  e.g.  moodle/auth/shibboleth/login 
(alternatively  the  moodle/auth/shibboleth  directory  could  be  used  for  that 
itself).
2. Within that directory there has to be a .htaccess file with
## Shibboleth authentication required
AuthType shibboleth
ShibRequireSession On
require valid-user
# Adapt the require statement to your needs
Furthermore  there  has  to  be  an  index.php file  within  that  directory  with  the  following 
content:
3. The moodle/login/index.php file has to be extended by:
if  ($CFG->shib_user_attribute  &&  $_SERVER[$CFG-
>shib_user_attribute])  {$frm->username  = 
$_SERVER[$CFG >shib_user_attribute];
$frm->password = substr(base64_encode($_SERVER[$CFG-
>shib_user_attribute]),0,8);}
after every "$frm = data_submitted();" line. What the code actually does is to 
"fill"  the  form  data  with  the  shib_user_attribute  that  is  used  in 
moodle/auth/shibboleth/lib.php:auth_user_login($username,  $password)  to 
check if this user is authenticated. The password line is not really necessary, 
but may be useful if an admin decides to convert a shibboleth user account 
into a manual one 
4. In the moodle/login directory there should be a .htaccess file  with  the following 
content (the statements have to be commented out per default because they may 
cause problems on moodle instances on webservers that  don't  have Shibboleth 
installed):
## Shibboleth lazy session
#AuthType shibboleth
#ShibRequireSession Off
#require shibboleth
5. On the login page there has to be a link to the moodle/auth/sibboleth/login directory 
(can be done manually by the moodle admin modifying the moodlelib strings).
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